Anarchy in Alifuru: The History of Stateless Societies in the Maluku Islands

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ANARCHY IN ALIFURU

The History of Stateless Societies in the Maluku Islands
- Bima Satria Putra

In the sprawling seas of the Maluku Islands lies a forgotten history -
not of kings and sultans, but of people who lived without them.

Anarchy in Alifuru reclaims the stories of the stateless societies of
eastern Indonesia, revealing a world where political authority was
earned, not inherited, and communities thrived through consensus
rather than command. Drawing from early European travelogues, oral
folklore, and anarchist anthropology, Bima Satria Putra invites us into
a realm where power was shared, and hierarchy was optional. This
groundbreaking work flips the script on conventional Indonesian
historiography. Instead of focusing on sultanates like Ternate and
Tidore, it explores the Alifuru World: a vibrant mosaic of
decentralized island societies who chose autonomy over submission.
Through vivid accounts of communal deliberations and egalitarian
leadership, Putra illustrates how these societies resisted both Islamic
state-building and European colonial conquest by refusing to be
governed.

Anarchy in Alifuru is a meditation on freedom and the human desire
to live without domination. For readers of James C. Scott and David
Graeber, this book offers a powerful testament to the ingenuity of
societies often dismissed as primitive. In a world increasingly shaped
by centralized power, the story of the Alifuru reminds us that another
way of organizing life not only existed, but thrived.

Bio: Bima Satria Putra is a writer, researcher, and translator. Interested in
the study of history, anthropology, and ecology. His works include: Perang
yang Tidak Akan Kita Menangkan: Anarkisme & Sindikalisme dalam
Pergerakan Kolonial hingga Revolusi Indonesia (1908-1948) and Dayak
Mardaheka: Sejarah Masyarakat Tanpa Negara di Pedalaman Kalimantan.
He is currently conducting research on the Fire Tribes Project and
remains committed to writing while serving his 15-year prison sentence
from 2021.

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Anarchy in alifuru

The History of Stateless Societies in the Maluku Islands

Bima Satria Putra

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Anarchy in Alifuru.

The History of Stateless Societies in the Maluku Islands
Bima Satria Putra

Cover image by @hisamalgibran
Interior design by @m.u.h.e.e

Released by Minor Compositions 2026
Colchester / New York / Port Watson

Published in collaboration with Page Against the Machine

ISBN: 978-1-57027-395-7

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Anarchy in alifuru

The History of Stateless Societies in the Maluku Islands

Preface to the English Edition

Introduction

Chapter 1.

Non-state Spaces:

The Earliest European Reports
Towards Banda

The Predecessors and the Successors
Power of the Chieftain

The Alifuru World

Closing

Chapter 2.

State Formation in Maluku
Ancient Tales

Expansion and Conquest
Center — Periphery Relationship

Political Fugitives and Refugees

Closing

Vii

xi

37

37
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65

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E=Z] TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 3. 67
The Mardika Strategy:

Preventing State Formation

Siwa-Lima as Primitive War 67
Indigenous Confederation 74
The Miracle of Trading 79
How Rich are the Orang Kaya? 88
Closing 93
Conclusion 95

Alifuru: Conquest & Liberation

References 104

About the Author 114

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Preface to the English Edition

“Re-assemble the atoms of our Zomian mind
So we can climb up high

Wander along and beyond the borders

Up in the highlands of my Zomia”

— The Observatory, “Oscilla”

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P-t~n. PA". P>t~n

The place of Indonesia in the imaginary and discourse of
contemporary leftist politics in the English-speaking world is
conspicuously limited. Beyond a few fleeting references to its
historic role in the Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia remains
largely absent from many of the key discussions shaping radical
political thought today. This absence is striking, given the rich
and often radical political currents that have flowed through
the archipelago. This translation of a critical work by Bima
Satria Putra, undertaken in collaboration with comrades from
the Yogyakarta-based publishing project Page Against the
Machine, aims to address this gap. This translation effort is
not intended as a one-off endeavor, but as part of a broader,
ongoing project to bring Indonesian perspectives to a wider
audience while fostering connections across linguistic and
political divides.

Mirna Wabi-Sabi’s concept of “Anarcho-Transcreation” provides

viii |

a useful framework for understanding this effort. Rather than
seeking one-to-one correspondence between words and meanings,
Anarcho- Transcreation emphasizes the creation of texts that resonate
deeply within specific political and cultural contexts. It is a process
deeply embedded in mutuality, solidarity, and the practical needs
of movements. This is not just about moving words from one
language to another, but about capturing the spirit, urgency,
and lived realities of those who resist. In this case, it also serves
as a means of generating tangible support for imprisoned
comrades and marginalized voices whose struggles often go
unrecognized in mainstream discourse. English-speaking leftist
circles, perhaps more than those of many other languages,
have a tendency to overlook the importance of translation as a
political act. Yet translation is not merely a linguistic exercise.
It is a process of amplifying narratives that power seeks to
repress or render invisible. The histories of stateless spaces and
zones of freedom — from the Zomian highlands to the Alifuru
communities of the Maluku Islands — are often precisely those
that state power has the greatest interest in suppressing or
erasing. In bringing these histories to light, translation becomes
an act of recovery, a way of challenging the silences imposed by
dominant historical narratives.

The work of translating these Indonesian texts, then, is not just
a historical project, but an invitation to rethink the present. It
asks us what we might learn from these histories, how they can
inform our current struggles for autonomy, mutual aid, and
freedom. As the Singaporean band The Observatory sings of
re-assembling our Zomian minds, this effort seeks to reconnect
us with radical traditions that, though geographically distant,
are resonant with contemporary struggles. Even if the Zomian
world or Alifuru society no longer exist in the same form,
the spirit of these stateless spaces persists, offering powerful
inspiration for ongoing and dispersed practices of resistance and

| ix

liberation. In this sense, the project of translating Indonesian
radical texts is part of a broader effort to build a global political
imagination that refuses the erasure of marginalized voices. It
is a reminder that the world of radical ideas is richer and more
varied than the Western canon alone would suggest, and that
true internationalism demands a recognition of these diverse
histories of struggle. The task, then, is not just to translate
words, but to build the networks of solidarity that make those
words meaningful in the context of ongoing struggles for
freedom and justice.

About

Proyek Suku Api (The Fire Tribe Project)

The history of Nusantara is oriented
around rulers and conquerors. Proyek
Suku Api seeks to deconstruct mainstream
historiography by focusing on those who
were ruled and conquered, namely the
various stateless societies in Nusantara.
Proyek Suku Api aims to cover as many
regions as possible, including Kalimantan,
Maluku, and Java.

Contact: pustakacatut@gmail.com

Page Against the Machine

@)

other critical social issues into English to
elevate the narratives from non-European

li hand witnesses to events or their own

Page Against the Machine, a small
independent publisher promoting. self-
publishing, has been operating since 2019.
We aim to translate anarchist texts and

and non-academic writers who are first-

experiences.

As a cooperative, we are collectively managed under egalitarian,
mutual cooperation and solidarity principles, ensuring that every
member has access to resources, means of production, and benefits.
Moving forward, we plan to collaborate with local authors and
publish a greater number of texts focusing on critical literature, social
struggles, feminism, anarchism, and queer topics.

Contact: pageagainstthemachine2024@gmail.com

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Introduction

“Tt is said that the history of peoples who have a history is
the history of class struggle. It might be said, with at least
as much truthfulness, that the history of peoples without

history is a history of their struggle against the State.”

— Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State

ocieties without states have existed and have been acommon

feature of human history across the globe, particularly in
Southeast Asia. Steinberg (1987) stated that “far in the past,
as today, Southeast Asia may well have been home for more
different non-state ethnic groups than any other part of the
world.” He described the situation as follows:

“... Whether in the mainland or in the islands,
these hundreds of small peoples differed from
those of dominant nearby state societies in many
fundamental ways. There were a great many more
such non-state societies, but in most cases they
were a great deal smaller in population than the
state societies. They did not have the very steep
ladder of social rank all the way from slave to
sacral king as in the state societies; most simply
have village heads or elders; while some also had a
superior social class of chiefs.”

xii | Introduction

Stateless societies were spread across the Indonesian archipelago,
including Maluku. Unfortunately, in Indonesian historiography,
the history of the Maluku Islands is often centered around
the discussion of the growth of Islamic Sultanates (especially
Ternate and Tidore) amid the spice trade. That era came to
an end when they fell to the colonial expansion of European
nations. These two kingdoms were located on two minuscule
islands situated across from each other. On the other hand, it
is difficult to find information about how the “frontier regions”
in Maluku played their roles in trade, religion, demography,
and political exchange with the wider region, which to some
extent had global consequences. In addition to being scantily
recorded in national history, the peripheral areas of Maluku are
usually mentioned only in the context of them being dragged
into events happening in the center, namely the Ternate-Tidore
area (and later Ambon). Within such a paradigm, peripheral
phenomena are typically understood as the results of factors
occurring at the center, rather than the other way around.

The explanation: Our historiography indeed emphasizes the
activities of rulers and power. “Power” is a key concept by which
the political center is seen as influencing its subjects. The center
possesses the ability to regulate, mobilize, measure, and oversee
the periphery, and it is rarely viewed the other way around.
This paradigm appears to be widely accepted, so much so that
even though the term “Maluku” existed before the arrival of
Islam, some believe that the term “Maluku” comes from the
Arabic word muluk (Jglol), which means “kings.” Maluku is
then interpreted as the “land of kings” or “land of a thousand
kings.” This is supported by the fact that tribal or village leaders
held grand titles, including “raja” (king). However, many of
their social organizations are difficult to describe as kingdoms
and are more accurately referred to as stateless societies. At a

Introduction | xiii

certain period, these “kings” were the result of appointments,
promotions, and grants made by states that claimed power or
conquered the regions where these communities resided.

Indeed, the term “Maluku” was initially used only to refer
to the clove-producing islands in Northern Maluku, namely
Ternate and Tidore. As both expanded their territories, the
name Maluku was then used to refer to all the regions that
were either conquered by or recognized the dominance of
Ternate or Tidore, including Halmahera, Bacan, Makian, and
Seram. The formation of the colonial state of the Dutch East
Indies led to the gradual use of “Maluku” to refer to the entire
region under the Maluku Residency, which was established
in 1922 and included the Kei, Aru, Tanimbar, Wetar, and
Kisar islands. These regions had not previously been called
or considered themselves part of Maluku. The Republic of
Indonesia continued this colonial administrative division, and
Maluku later came to be accepted as a cultural concept that
unified all the inhabitants of the eastern Indonesian islands,
particularly the southern Maluku islands. From the time of
ancient kingdoms to the modern state, the world referred to as
Maluku is a space that can be fully understood only as a “state
space,” and likewise, its history follows this narrative.

This understanding not only prioritizes the center and ignores
the periphery, but also frames the history of Maluku entirely
as the history of its kings. In this context, the main topics of
study related to Maluku are often focused on the history of the
spread of Islam and the formation of the Sultanates, the spread
of Christianity-Catholicism and the formation of the colonial
Dutch East Indies, or the interaction of power structures
within the context of the spice trade. Although there has been
growing attention beyond the historiography of power, much

Xiv_ | Introduction

of it remains overlooked by Indonesian scholars or has not yet
been translated.

In fact, although northern Maluku was dominated by a group
of Muslim sultanates, particularly Ternate and Tidore, which
emerged with the rise of the spice and forest products trade
between regions in the 15th century, the central and southern
regions were stateless. These areas were made up of settlements
led by tribal chiefs or lineage leaders, which could be highly
hierarchical (such as in Kisar and Kei) or relatively egalitarian

(like in Aru).
Therefore, this book provides space for a type of historiography

for those who were conquered, marginalized, and on the
periphery. I attempt to reconstruct what James C. Scott, in his
book The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of
Upland Southeast Asia (2009), describes it as a “non-state space.”
Scott’s study focuses on the highlands of Zomia in Southeast
Asia, where societies had fled from state projects — slavery,
conscription, taxes, forced labor, epidemics, and warfare — of
the surrounding nation-states. This book is highly provocative
and has sparked ongoing academic debates about the type
of “anarchist” societies that are believed to have deliberately
chosen to remain stateless.

The challenge is that Scott’s subject of study is highland
societies in Asia, not the archipelago in the Nusantara. There
is a different context that makes Scott’s analysis not directly
applicable to the archipelagic regions. For instance, states on the
western side of the Nusantara and the Asian mainland typically
emerged on the coasts and river deltas to monopolize access to
goods exchange with the inland and highland societies. This
geographical contour is difficult to find on the small, dispersed
islands of Maluku, which have small populations. Additionally,

Introduction | XV

there is some opinion that seafarers had more opportunities to
avoid oppressive elite groups compared to mountain dwellers. '
This requires serious comparative study because both stateless
seafaring and highland societies exist in Maluku.

In its historical definition, anarchism is certainly stateless,
but stateless societies are not necessarily anarchist. Modern
anarchism, which developed in Europe, is better understood in
terms of specific ideological pillars and principles.* When I use
the term “anarchy” here, it refers more to a broader libertarian
universe, which is not always connected with historical terms
but includes struggles and initiatives against authoritarianism,
opposition to domination, and advocacy for egalitarian forms
of relationships. Anarchy in this context has nothing to do with
the revolutionary socialist tradition of anarchism as seen in
Bakunin, primarily because its focus is on alternative political
institutions (which are stateless) and does not address other
aspects such as economic structure or gender studies.

However, I am not the first to use an anarchist approach
outside its historical tradition. Scott is one such example, as
well as the anarchist and anthropologist David Graeber, and
Pierre Clastres with his classic work on South American Indian
communities — specifically the Guayaki — titled Society Against
the State (1977). A global overview of this approach is provided
by Harold Barclay in People without Government (1992), with
the subtitle “The Anthropology of Anarchism.”

i See the study by Olivier Ferrari and Jacques Ivanoff, From Padi States to
Commercial States: Reflections on Identity and the Social Construction Space in the
Borderlands of Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar (2015).

2. Felipe Correa. Anarchist Theory and History in Global Perspective (no
date). Instituto de Teoria e Histéria Anarquista / Institute for Anarchist Theory and
History (ITHA/IATH).

xvi | Introduction

This book is essentially a “history of anarchism,” examining
stateless spaces in Maluku, or the extended eastern Indonesian
region, where societies continued to follow local political
traditions and norms. In this context, I describe the forms of
interaction that occurred up until the 19th century between
stateless indigenous societies in central and southern Maluku
(and some other areas in northern Maluku) and both Islamic
sultanates and surrounding European colonial powers. I
use Scott’s analysis to complement the study based on the

bibliographic data I have gathered.

This stateless space covers nearly one-fifth of the territory of
the Republic of Indonesia. However, its core population now
numbers only two million people. They inhabit thousands of
large and small islands, primarily including Alor and Flores
in East Nusa Tenggara, extending eastward through Wetar,
Kisar, the Leti Islands, Babar, and reaching the southeastern-
most point in the Tanimbar Islands. The stateless space can
also be extended northward to the Aru Islands, Kei, and into
Central Maluku, including parts of or the interior of Seram
Island, Buru, Banda Islands, and up to the northern part of
Halmahera.

The stateless space I am referring to is very extensive but
lacks a specific name. In some early European literature,
we occasionally find terms like “Timor Laut” [Tanimbar],
“Southern Islands,

»

Southwestern Islands,” or “Southeastern
Islands.” The historical use of the name “Maluku” is somewhat
problematic because it was originally used to refer only to the
five main islands around Ternate-Tidore. Referring to it as
“Central and Southern Maluku” is now culturally acceptable
to all the inhabitants of the region.

Introduction | xvii

Nevertheless, I propose that this stateless space be referred to
as the “Alifuru World” as a counter-narrative to the “Maluku
World” proposed by Leonard Y. Andaya. From the center of
Ternate-Tidore civilization [Maluku], the islands to the south
were considered the domain of wild, primitive, and uncivilized
people. In local terms, Alifuru, which according to van Baarda
(1895) comes from the Tidore vocabulary halefuru, consists
of hale meaning “land” and furu meaning “wild” or “savage.”
This is also why the southernmost sea in Maluku is called the
Arafura Sea.?

Nevertheless, the term Alifuru originally referred to a broad
category encompassing all non-Muslim and non-Christian
societies living in the inaccessible inland regions of eastern
Maritime Southeast Asia, not limited to Maluku. This name
was also used to refer to the Minahasa people and other
tribes in Central Sulawesi, as well as to Papua. This cultural
boundary has the same political dimension, denoting societies
in eastern Indonesia that were relatively autonomous or not
fully integrated into the power structures of the sultanates and
colonial states.

In Chapter 1, I will discuss the stateless societies, their forms
of social organization, and the history of their encounters and
early interactions with foreign influences in the context of
trade, the spread of religions, and colonialism. I will refer as
much as possible to primary sources, including various reports
and records from explorers, traders, missionaries, and colonial
officials. Although many of these sources are highly biased, they
remain useful references when used critically and contextually.

3: There are several other etymological estimates regarding ‘alifuru.’ See

Adolph Bernhard Meyer, Uber die Namen Papiia, Dajak und Alfuren (1882), 13-15.

xviii. | Introduction

Stateless societies in Maluku should not be seen as passive and
merely obedient subjects. In many places, both the sultanates
and colonial states claimed large parts of the stateless space de
jure, but de facto, much of this space was too fluid to be controlled
due to the limitations of military power, communication and
transportation technology of the time.

In Seram, Halmahera, and Buru, many communities avoided
the state formation processes that brought war, taxes, and forced
labor by living a nomadic lifestyle or residing in highland areas
with difficult access, far from government reach. The situation
is different in Tanimbar or Aru, where, although incorporated
into state territory, people practically lived without government
due to the absence of administrative structures and the mix of
state interference in local affairs.

From the late 15th century to the 18th century, this stateless
space gradually diminished and eventually disappeared with the
formation of the Dutch East Indies colonial state. This process of
“incorporation” occurred gradually and through various means,
including conquest and slaughter, as well as peace treaties that
were either entirely voluntary or manipulative. Often, these
treaties were initially motivated by political motives to secure
allies or rulers who could protect them from their enemies,
eventually leading to full recognition of state sovereignty over
them. The stages of state formation, territorial expansion, and
their relationship with conquest will be discussed in Chapter 2.

While power consolidation took place to a certain extent, a
similar scenario did not occur elsewhere in Maluku. Although
they were involved in extensive trading networks, states did not
form within their societies. Chapter 3 attempts to explain the
thesis that: stateless societies had mechanisms to prevent the
emergence of states within their communities.

Introduction | xix

Therefore, this book adopts the understanding that there are
dualism of worlds, or spaces, namely the world of Maluku
and the world of Alifuru. These two spaces, the state and the
stateless, the center and the periphery, have dynamic, layered,
and diverse relationships that vary over time.

I do not mean to suggest that social organization within and
between stateless spaces remained the same over the past 200
years. Different historical periods had different impacts on
different places. While I have made efforts to consult the earliest
reports from European explorers and sailors, I must also utilize
reports from colonial administrators as well as contemporary
historians and ethnographers to understand how the portrayal
of chieftain authority, independence among kinship units and
settlements, and their autonomy from Islamic sultanates and
later European colonial states evolved.

The descriptions and historical accounts of Maluku that I
present in this section do not replace the sources from the
indigenous people of Maluku. Europeans who came to Maluku
were usually there for only a few days, so their opportunities for
observation were very limited, and they often misunderstood
what they saw. Furthermore, their observations were also
influenced by their own socio-cultural backgrounds, filled with
prejudices that placed Westerners as superior, along with their
civilization and religion. As a result, their reports often contain
derogatory statements about the people they encountered, such
as comments on skin color, clothing, or lifestyle.

Alfred Russel Wallace is no exception. He spent months in
the Amazon and the archipelago, building closer relationships
with the local populations during his research. However,
like other Europeans of his time, his fair praise still carries

XX | Introduction

a condescending tone for today’s readers, as he presents
an almost utopian impression that invites admiration:

“It is very remarkable that among people in a very
low stage of civilization we find some approach
to such a perfect social state. I have lived with
communities of savages in South America and in
the East, who have no laws or law courts but the
public opinion of the village freely expressed. Each
man scrupulously respects the rights of his fellow,
and any infraction of those rights rarely or never
takes place. In such a community, all are nearly
equal.”

Therefore, European historical sources should be treated
as a complement to the original sources from the Maluku
communities. I am very fond of conducting comparative studies
with oral history, listening to folklore from elders where the
boundaries between legend and history become blurred. ‘This is
something I cannot fully address. Due to certain limitations, I
have confined this book to a literature review.

If recent findings differ, I leave the responsibility of providing
accurate information to those with the capacity for field
research. Fortunately, such work already exists, namely Orang-
orang Kalah: Kisah Penyingkiran Masyarakat Adat Kepulauan
Maluku (2004), edited by Roem Topatimasang. I suggest
that my book be read before reading Orang-orang Kalah and
serve as a guide to understanding the contemporary political
and cultural context in Maluku. We must understand that
the reality of marginalization of indigenous peoples and the
expropriation of space today is clearly shaped by the historical

4, Alfred Russel Wallace, The Malay Archipelago (1877), 595.

Introduction | xxi

conjuncture related to the relationship between central and
peripheral powers. Understanding the past helps our struggle
today.

I must express my gratitude for the various assistance and
support given to me. To Jesse and Risa, Arya and Intan,
Claudia Liberani, and also to Vrije Bond in the Netherlands
for providing research funding. There are many people who
cannot or do not want their names to be mentioned, but you
surely realize that without your roles, I would never have been
able to complete this book.

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Figure 1. Maluku Map

Non-state Spaces:

The Earliest European Reports

In 1511, the Portuguese carried out a territorial conquest that
became, at that time, the farthest-reaching in the history of
humanity. A Portuguese fleet of 600 men, led by Afonso de
Albuquerque, departed from India (Goa had been conquered
the previous year) intending to conquer Malacca to monopolize
the international spice trade and thwart Muslim navigation
in the Indian Ocean. This effort aimed to break the deadlock
caused by the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Empire
in 1453, which closed for Christian traders the overland route
via the Silk Road to Asia’s valuable goods. The port city of
Malacca, which controlled the narrow and strategic Strait of
Malacca, became the point where all sea trade between China
and India converged. In addition to gaining control over
important sites for the distribution of spices to East Asia and
Europe, the Portuguese also came closer to cloves (Eugenia
caryophyllata) from Ternate and the islands off west coast of
Halmahera, as well as nutmeg and mace (Myristica fragrans)
from Banda Islands.

Towards Banda

For a long time, Europe had vaguely heard descriptions of
these Spice Islands from Muslim traders, who dominated the
market not only for nutmeg and cloves from the Spice Islands,
but also for ginger from China and cinnamon from India. For
hundreds of years, the Arabs succeeded in keeping the location

2 | Towards Banda

of the Spice Islands a secret. They fabricated stories about the
dangers of sailing to these islands posed by fantastical monsters
and terrifying flesh-eating birds that guarded them. Such tales
were designed to help Arab traders maintain their monopoly
over the spice trade.

ai
ra

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Wath ded

Figure 2. Map of the Banda Islands in 1599 (Source: Tweede Schipvaart
naar Oost-Indié under Jacob Cornelisz. van Nes and Wijbrant van Warwyck
in 1598-1600).

The earliest European report on this island can be traced back
to the Italian explorer Ludovico de Varthema, who (arguably)
arrived in 1505. In his work titled Itinerario de Ludouico de
Varthema Bolognese |The Travels of Ludouico de Varthema
of Bologna], published in Rome in 1510, Varthema describes
Banda as follows:

“There are no kings here, nor even a single
governor, but there are some peasants who
resemble wild beasts and have no understanding...

Towards Banda | 3

Their belief is getile, but they are like the castes
from Calcutta [India] called Poliar [Pulaya] and
Hirava [Vettuvan]; their intellect is weak, and as
for their strength, they have no energy, but live like
wild beasts... There is no need for law enforcement
here, because these people are so foolish that if
they wished to commit a crime, they would not
know how to do it.”*

The Portuguese had not yet read Varthema’s work, as the
Portuguese survey from Malacca to the Moluccas was only
conducted in 1511, a year after his work was published. One of
the first Portuguese reports on Banda itself was written by Tomé
Pires, a pharmacist who lived in Malacca for four years (1512-
1515). Pires visited Java, Sumatra, and the Moluccas, and from
his diligent work came Suma Oriental [The Eastern World].
This work is the earliest and most comprehensive description
of the history, geography, ethnography, and economy of the
eastern regions. Pires provides a report that somewhat differs
from Varthema’s:

“These [islands] have villages; they have no king;
they are ruled by cabilas and by the elders. Those
along the sea-coast are Moorish merchants. It is
thirty years since they began to be Moors in the
Banda islands. There are a few heathen inside the
country.”°

5 Lodovico de Varthema Jtinerario de Ludouico de Verthema Bolognese ne lo
Egypto ne la Suria ne la Arabia deserta & felice ne la Persia ne la India & ne la Ethiopia.
La fede el uiuere & costumi de tutte le prefate prouincie (Giovanni Angelo Scinzenzeler,
Milan, 1523) Ch. XXXIII.

6. Tomé Pires and Armando Cortesao (Penj). Zhe Suma Oriental of Tomé
Pires: An Account of the East, From the Red Sea to Japan, Written in Malacca and india
in 1512-1515. (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944), 26.

4 | Towards Banda

The gentios [gentile] or “heathens” in the interior of Banda
Island mentioned by Varthema and Pires refer to indigenous
peoples with animistic beliefs, the native religions of the
locals. Both Varthema and Pires were alluding to those the
people of Maluku these days call Alifuru (or “native people”).
The difference is that Varthema did not report the presence
of Muslims. Meanwhile, Pires mentioned Moors living on the
coast, referring to the local inhabitants who embraced Islam.

Jute dailha Achande
ha noy nox

Figure 3. Portuguese watercolor c.1540, unnamed, found in the
Cédice Casanatense, depicting the people of Banda Island.

What is unclear is the cabila term, which comes from the Arabic
plural word qabilah (Als) meaning “tribe.” The Portuguese
and Arabs used this term to refer to the Kabyle people, one
of the Berber tribal groups in northern Algeria. Indeed, Pires
wrote his initial impressions of the Banda inhabitants based

Towards Banda | 5

on his Portuguese background.’ Perhaps what Pires meant by
cabila were Muslim traders from various parts of the Middle
East, possibly Arabs and Persians, who had settled in Banda.
This is because Pires distinguished them from the “Moors,”
a term Europeans used to refer to Muslims in general. Arab
Muslims invaded Algeria since the 600s, bringing exotic spices
such as turmeric, nutmeg, ginger, cloves, and cinnamon from
the Spice Islands in eastern Indonesia, eventually integrating
them into the Mediterranean trade complex. Alongside the
Arabs, the Kabyle were among the nations that fought against
Christian kingdoms and ruled in the Al-Andalus region,
southwestern Europe, which included parts of present-day
Spain and Portugal. Pires might have referring to this context.

However, it is possible that Pires felt that the leadership of
the Banda people was very similar to that of the actual Kabyle
Berbers, hence he referred to them as cabila. The Kabyle people
have been described by historians and anthropologists as an
“ordered anarchy.” One Arab scholar, Ibn Khaldun (1332-
1406), in his most famous work, once explained that the Ziz
mountains they inhabit “is one of the most difficult of their
refuges to approach and one of the easiest to defend. From
there, they defy the power of the government and pay tax only
when it suits them to do so.” (Roberts, 2014: 147).

Pires’ report is consistent and corroborated by another report
by Fernao Lopes de Castanheda, son of a royal officer who
served as a judge in Goa. In 1528, he accompanied his father
to India. During his ten years there (1528-1538), he gathered
as much information as possible about the discoveries and

Ts Pires was raised during the successful expulsion of Muslims (reconquista)
in Al-Andalus. If Pires was indeed born in 1465, then the fall of the Emirate of
Granada as the last Islamic kingdom in Europe in 1495 would still be fresh in his
memory. During these years, Pires had not yet travelled to Asia.

6 | Towards Banda

conquests by the Portuguese to write a book on the subject.
Castanheda also traveled extensively to the Moluccas. Upon
his return to Portugal, he worked on a historical work, the
first edition of which was published in 1551. In that book, he

described Banda as follows:

“this island is inhabited by the gentios, people
who are poor and coarse, and the most notable
reprehensible thing is the absence of a king to
obey; each village has a regedor [governor] whom I
call Xabandar |harbormaster], and they obey only
out of friendship.”®

From these three reports, we can see that in less than half a
century, trading activities gradually organized settlements in
Banda. Initially, the animistic society had no leader (acephalous),
until village leader and cabila emerged. Villiers (1981) explains
that Banda leaders (referred to as orang kaya) shared control
of trading activities with the syahbandar, referred to as cabila
by Pires. Syahbandar is a Persian title meaning “Harbor
Master” introduced by the Javanese and Malays. In Maluku,
the syahbandar, mostly foreign Muslim traders, oversaw
international trade and foreign traders at the port. They were
often trusted and appointed due to their extensive experience
and foreign language skills. At a certain period, these traders
must have gained respect and influence in Banda, but their
authority was still limited to spice trade along the coast.

In turn, the local leaders of Banda earned the title orang kaya
from the prosperity generated by the large-scale trade profits.
Villiers (1981) compares the power of the Banda elders, whom

8. Fernao Lopes de Castanheda, Historia do descobrimento e conquista de
India pelos Portugueses (1833), Book VI, Chapter V, 7.

Towards Banda | 7

he refers to as the “oligarchy of elders,” with some indigenous
communities in the Philippines during the early Spanish
arrival. Like in the Philippines, Villiers believes that in Banda,
land and spice tree ownership was communal (w/ayat), with
some managed by certain individuals whom the orang kaya
could mobilize to cultivate the ulayat land on their behalf.

The orang kaya title is commonly found throughout the
archipelago. However, Kathirithamby-Wells (1986) explains
that there is a significant difference between the orang kaya
in the western and eastern parts of the archipelago: While the
orang kaya figures in the west were within a complex Sultanate
structure and largely defined by the level and nature of royal
authority and the commercial structure of the state, the orang
kaya in the eastern islands functioned as a trading oligarchy
within tribal societies (mostly without any state or centralized
authority).

Unlike Ternate-Tidore, the absence of a king or single ruler
in Banda compelled these leaders to act together to enforce
political control or achieve shared economic benefits based
on consensuses that was achieved through deliberations.
Europeans had to deal with a unified group of orang kaya
who achieved their positions of authority via the consent of
the people. When the relationship between Banda and the
Portuguese — initially established a hundred years prior — was
still amicable in nature, the Portuguese Captain of Maluku,
Antonio de Brito, in 1522, made a friendship treaty with all
the leaders on the island. Proudly, De Brito wrote to the King
of Portugal, Joao III, about his achievement:

8 | Towards Banda

“I have not yet written to Your Majesty about the
padrao [inscription] that I have erected in Banda
— the most beautiful and grand that can be found
with Your Majesty’s arms, nor the price that I have
agreed upon in another letter... That price is for the
cloves brought here and for the mace and nutmeg
produced in Banda. I made this agreement forever
with the prominent people and syahbandar on
the island, because they have no king, and they all
appointed me to execute it and agreed that anyone
who opposes it must die.””

The Portuguese never built a fortress in Banda, and this also
drew the permanent presence of the Dutch there. However, as
time passed, the Banda people began to sense that the Dutch
treatment was too harsh, thus leading them, in 1612, to seek
assistance from the English by sending an envoy to negotiate
on behalf of all orang kaya of Banda. When the English arrived,
it was reported that they were ready to hand over their land to
the English based on the agreement of all orang kaya (Villiers,
1981: 729-730).

The recorded deliberations of people in Banda Islands may
have been facilitated by the proximity of villages and islands.
Whenever an important matter concerning the continuity of
the spice trade in Banda came about, the people could easily
gather and produce collective decisions. This cohesion was rarely
displayed in other islands of the Alifuru World: Geographical

convenience and shared economic interests ensured political
unity.

9. Letter of Anténio de Brito to the King of Portugal, Ternate, February 11,
1523, in Artur Basilio de SA, Documentacao para a histéria das Missées do Padroado
Portugués do Oriente Vol.2. (Agensia Geral do Ultramar, 1955) Quoted and translated
from Villiers (1981).

Towards Banda | 9

Villiers refers to Banda people as “republicans”; Castanheda
describes how people obeyed the syahbandar based on friendship
[amizade]. To provide context, Villiers (1981: 728) compares
the Banda society to what he describes as the “oligarchic rule
of small chiefs” in pre-colonial Philippine society. When the
Spanish first arrived there, the Filipino settlements (barangay)
were led by elders called datu or raha.

While this comparison may be accurate, there are still significant
geographical and cultural differences. Furthermore, the term
“oligarchy of elders” implies gerontocracy, or power within a
ruling class that accumulates with age, making the oldest person
the most powerful. In fact, the Portuguese Captain in Ternate,
Antonio Galvao, noted an interesting custom: trade affairs in
the Maluku Islands were conducted by women. Galvao even
commented that whenever decisions related to trade were
made, “all family members had to give advice and opinions,
and if someone said ‘no,’ even if that family member had only
been six or seven years old of age, they could not proceed.”'®
Galvao may have been exaggerating and his intention may have
possibly even be to insult. However, he essentially emphasized
that in Maluku, there was a highly participatory deliberation
practice that placed elders in an honorable position but not as
sole decision-makers.

Prior to the 1621 massacre, Banda had been a trading hub that
connected other islands in the central and southern regions
(around Seram, Aru, Kei, and Tanimbar) to Makassar, Java,
and the Philippines. The Malay title orang kaya was adopted
to refer to the prosperous local leaders of Banda who thrived
from trade. Gradually, this title seemed to spread to other
islands, possibly in the same manner, although in some cases,

10. Hubert Jacobs, ed. A treatise on the Moluccas (1971), 74-75.

10 | The Predecessors and the Successors

this title is believed to have been given by the Dutch. Should
we believe that the authority and political character of orang
kaya in various parts of Maluku were more or less similar, it
would then be useful to compare Banda with other stateless
societies in Maluku, particularly the islands south of Banda
which were considered problematic by the Dutch. “they
could not really be regarded as having rulers,”” according to
Dutch reports, because their leaders “had very little influence
over their subjects, whose opinions they had to respect, and

accommodate their administration to them.”!!

The Predecessors and the Successors

The southern region in this context consists of Southwest
Islands (formerly known as Serwatty Islands) which range from
west to east: Wetar, Romang, Kisar, the Leti Islands, Sermata,
Damar, to Babar Islands. It also refers to the Southeast Islands,
which include Aru, Kei, and Tanimbar Islands. Throughout
this region, orang kaya are commonly found, and in Kisar,
Tanimbar, and Kei, they usually come from the “highest class”
in the local social stratification. In Kisar, society recognizes
three classes: the nobility (marna), the middle class (anan),
which makes up the majority of the population, and the slave
class (aka), consisting of war captives or purchased individuals.

This three-tiered stratification can also be observed in the Kei
and Tanimbar Islands, which consist of the nobility (7e/), the
middle class (vem), and the slave class (Zri).

11. Political Report of 1837 (Staatkundig Overzicht van Nederlandsche
Indie) 1837 (Jakarta: National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia, 1971), 155.
Quoted and translated from Sutherland, Sea-ways and Gatekeeper (2021), 129.

The Predecessors and the Successors | 11

~*~
ae

L8H 25>

%

Figure 4. Kisar Islanders.

This classification can be traced back to the prolonged
interaction between two types of communities deciding to
coexist in one location. According to Thorburn (2018: 116),
during the Majapahit era in the 14th to 16th centuries, traders
and political refugees from Java, Bali, and Sumbawa arrived in
Maluku. In the Kei Islands, for example, there are people from
Tanebar Evav (Tanimbar Kei), most of whom are Hindu and
claim their ancestral origins from Bali.

Many folk legends from Maluku and Nusa Tenggara often tell
of newcomers who requested permission from the native leaders
(autochthonous) to settle on unoccupied land or join existing
clan groups. The newcomers were then offered leadership
positions among the native population, as they were considered
to possess social and cultural advantages. This gave rise to the
phenomenon known as the ‘stranger king, which occurred
voluntarily and without military force. This unification could

12 | The Predecessors and the Successors

take various forms, but all within opposite categories: male-
female, old-young, internal-external, or sibling relationships,
etc. The relationship between the two could sometimes be
balanced, sometimes unequal, depending on the context of
that particular period.

Hagerdal (2012: 6) cited that this concept was encountered in
Kupang in 1797. The Timorese people, who were allies of the
Dutch, established settlements around Kupang. One of them
reportedly said to the Dutch East India Company (VOC)
master: “We, the kings, have the land, and you have the sea.’
The land rulers showed their respect to the sea rulers while still
having the means to exercise power during negotiations.

On Buru Island, there is a separation between geb fuk Buru-ro
(“people of Buru Island or mountains”) or geb fuka and geb
man-lau taun (“people whose affiliation flows/originates from
the sea” [i-e., foreigners]) or geb masi. Buru Island was claimed
by the Sultan of Ternate as one of his ‘vassals’ since the 16th
century and for centuries, foreigners have made claims and
drawn maps of Buru as a ‘model’ for their political aspirations.
The Muslim kings on the coast of Buru Island legitimized their
authority over the inland Alifuru people through the supremacy
of Ternate and Islam, and implemented a tribute system where
the Alifuru people would hand over a basket of rice, millet,
coconuts, sago, sweet potatoes, and tobacco, as well as perform
mandatory labor where a number of men would periodically
work specifically for the kings. Nevertheless, according to
Grimes (2006b: 136), the people of Buru “did not always
embrace these foreign concepts or the political relationships
that accompanied them.” For Buru people, the king was seen as
a ‘gatekeeper to Buru,’ meaning their role was to interact with
outsiders.

The Predecessors and the Successors | 13

Anthropological literature sometimes refers to this as diarchy
or heterarchy, which means dual sovereignty, consisting of the
predecessors from the native community or early arrivals, and
the foreign king who came later. Sahlin explains this as:

“

[T]wo forms of authority and legitimacy coexist
in a state of mutual dependence and reciprocal
incorporation. The native people and the foreign
rulers claim precedence on different bases. For the
underlying people it is the founder-principle: the
right of first occupancy — in the maximal case, the
claim of autochthony. Earth-people by nature,
often characterized as ‘the owners, their inherent
relation to the land gives them unique access to the
divine and ancestral sources of its productivity —
hence their indispensable ‘religious’ authority and
ritual functions. But the stranger-kings trump these
claims of priority in aggressive and transgressive
demonstrations of superior might, and thus take
over the sovereignty.” ”

In Kei Islands, this division became institutionalized and
stratified. “Mel” is a term for descendants of newcomers who
assume “external” roles, while “en” are descendants of the
native population who assume “internal” roles dealing with
spirits and ancestors, land and sea. The me/ and ren classes
essentially agree that they should live together in an egalitarian
relationship where ven will secure the position of teran nuhu (or
tuan tan, meaning land ruler) and me/ will hold administrative
or political leadership positions (Laksono, 1990: 110). The

12. Quoted from Todd Ryan Hooe “Little Kingdoms”: Adat and Inequality
in The Kei Islands, Eastern Indonesia (PhD Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 2012)

14. | Power of the Chieftain

actual hierarchical relationship only applies between me/

and the slave class (iri). Both are minorities and considered
newcomers (Adhuri, 201263).

‘These two groups form blood ties, thus rendering them siblings
and unable to intermarry, as that would be akin to incest. As
a result, a strict division gradually formed with clear political-
religious rights and functions for each group — At a glance, it
resembles a caste system. Stratification seems to have formed
on islands where newcomers asked for permission to join,
marry, or live with existing clan groups. When newcomers
lived separately or occupied unclaimed land, dichotomy still
emerged but did not become stratified. Although geb man-lau
taun on the Buru coast are recognized as superior, they do not
live together with inland geb fuk Bururo. As result, despite the
separation, we do not find stratification on Buru Island.

Conversely, Wetar-Kisar and Kei-Tanimbar are examples of
interactions where both communities live together in one
place, resulting in a hierarchical impression over time. This
phenomenon occurred especially when European colonialism
intervened with structural arrangements that differed from their
previous traditional political order: the strengthened authority
of leaders resulted in class disparities. This is stratification.

Power of the Chieftain

Despite the occurring stratification, the reports I have compiled
below show that leaders in all regions of Maluku held nominal
power with limited scope within their respective communities.
Stratification does not necessarily imply class inequality and
excessive accumulation of power, although this could lead
to such conditions if colonialism co-opted them. However,

Power of the Chieftain | 15

reports from the 17th to early 20th centuries confirm that this
did not happen.

For example, in 1662, during its initiation, the Dutch East India
Company (VOC) handed over the Dutch flag and appointed
a tribal chief in Kisar named Bekker (or Pakar) as an official,
and this formally placed Kisar under VOC control. This was
an effort to expand the monopoly in the southern Maluku
region while eliminating Portuguese influence in Timor. At
that time, Bekker offered that they sell beeswax, slaves, turtle
shells, and sandalwood exclusively to the VOC. When the
agreement was renewed in 1665, around 400 representatives
from various villages in Kisar gathered, deliberated, and agreed
to the contract. Hagerdal (2019: 6) refers to this phenomenon
as “a custom where a tribal chief could not make decisions
without general consent, [which] was also found in other parts
of southern Maluku in the 17th century.”

Each village on Kisar Island was led by orang kaya from the
marna class. English navigator George Windsor Earl (1841112)
observed that the orang kaya in Kisar administered justice
“like a father managing his family.” When Dutch sailor Dirk
Hendrik Kolff anchored in Kisar in 1825, nearly all the orang
kaya on the island gathered and deliberated:

“I have frequently observed, that the natives never
decide on any point at the moment, but consult with
each other until they have come to a determination.
I therefore left them for a time, that they might have

their deliberations to themselves.” !3

13. D.H Kolff, Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga (James Madden &
Co.,1840), 50.

16 | Power of the Chieftain

When Kolff continued his journey to Romang Island, he was
also amazed by the involvement of women in decision-making.
This was unusual in the political conditions of 19th-century
Europe. Dutch women were only allowed to be elected to
government positions in 1917, and it was not until 1919 that
all Dutch women could participate in elections. But in Romang
in 1825, Kolff wrote:

“The power of the Orang Kaya, however, is by no
means absolute, for in the event of any dispute the
chiefs of the villages assemble, and the decision is
carried by the majority of votes. It is remarkable
that sometimes, on the death of a chief, his power
is transferred to his wife, so that several women are
often to be seen among the chiefs when assembled
in conclave. The debates are occasionally continued
for two or three days, but they are usually settled

without much difference of opinion.” 4

Meanwhile, for Wetar Island, Hagerdal (2019b: 4) states
“there are no areas approaching [the form of] kingdoms, only
autonomous settlements.” The diary of Joannes de Hartog,
who visited Wetar in 1681, reports:

“Wetar is actually the name of the inhabitants of
the island, which is 70 to 80 miles in width and
length. In most places, this region is filled with high
and steep mountains that contain holes and caves
where the Alifuru live. They rarely communicate
or interact with the coastal inhabitants, except for
bartering beeswax... Generally, they are found to

14. Kolff, Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga (1840), 87.

Power of the Chieftain | 17

be non-religious, and there is very little respect

between the orang kaya and their subordinates.”

The inhabitants of Kei Islands live in villages (oh0i) led by
the orang kaya, most of whom are from the mel-mel class.
According to Catholic missionary Geurtjens, who worked in
the early 20th century, the orang kaya in Kei “used to be very
independent governors in their villages.” Van Wouden (1968:
36) commented on this:

“\.we must most likely interpret this to mean that
each village was essentially an independent unit...
He [orang kaya] was not allowed to act arbitrarily,
and for all important matters, he had to hold
meetings with the ‘elders’ of the family group.”

Stratification in Kei seems to have spread to the Tanimbar
Islands, as their social classification is identical. However, the
life of the Tanimbar people remained democratic. In the mid-
19th century, a pair of Scottish explorers, the Forbes, lived for
some time with the Tanimbar people. Naturalist Anna Forbes
(1887: 180) reported: “they are without rules, without masters,
they do not understand how to obey; you can request, pay,
barter, but you cannot command.” Her partner, Henry Ogg
Forbes, a botanist, also observed:

“Though they have an Orang Kaya or Chief, his
voice has but little more influence than any other
full-aged man’s. The “old men’s” opinion has some

weight with the younger men, but every man

15. Quoted from Hagerdal (2019b), 4-5.

18 | Power of the Chieftain

speaks out his mind boldly and fearlessly. When
any serious deliberation is going on, the whole
community crowds round the assembly room, the
women even taking part, and expressing freely and

without offence their opinions. The voice of the
16

majority is the law of their community.

Figure 5. Tanimbar people, in 1912.

Piet Drabbe, a Dutch missionary and anthropologist, is a
reliable information source for the Tanimbar people because
he served there for 20 years (1915-1935), learned the local
language, and conducted comparative studies with European
texts written before his time. “The tribal chief had no authority
at all. Matters were decided among themselves within the tribe
itself,” he wrote.'”

16. Henry Ogg Forbes. A Naturalists Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago (1885), 319.
17. Drabbe. Het leven van den Tanémbarees (1940), 178.

The Alifuru World | 19

Regarding the nature of the society, Drabbe concluded:

“One of the most striking features of the Tanimbar society is its
independence and democratic spirit. Everyone is free to express
their opinions in the assembly, including women. Leaders are
not truly recognized, and officials are respected as long as

people agree with them.”'*

‘The position of “orang kaya” can also be found in Aru Islands.
However, unlike the surrounding islands, Aru society does
not have social stratification. Various records from the early
modern period indicate that Aru society is multicultural,
non-hierarchical, and “fragmented into a large number of
autonomous settlements” (Hagerdal, 2019: 481). Dutch
explorer Jan Carstenszoon, during his expedition to Australia
in 1623, observed that the people in the Aru Islands:

“\..there is no king at all, and they are not ruled
by anyone; moreover, each country or village has
a certain orang kaya recognized as the head, who
nonetheless cannot decide on any deliberation
without prior knowledge or notification of all the
common people.”””

The Alifuru World

The above report came from the area south of Banda. However,
if we extend the scope of the reports, we find consistent results.
‘The expanded area in this manuscript will be referred to as the
Alifuru World. During the formation of states in Maluku and

18. Drabbe. Het leven van den Tanémbarees (1940), 9.

19. L.C.D van Dijk, 1859. Twee togten naar de Golf van Carpentaria: J.
Carstensz 1623, J. E. Gonzal 1756: benevens iets over den togt van G. Pool
en Pieter Pietersz. Scheltema.9-10.

20 | The Alifuru World

the early arrival of Europeans in the 16th century, the Alifuru
World nearly encompassed all the islands in today’s Maluku
Province (712,000 km?) and parts of the peripheral areas of
North Maluku Province. I extend this area by considering the
borders with the Indianized region of Bima and Sumbawa,
including Flores and Alor Islands in East Nusa Tenggara,
the interior of Sulawesi, and parts of the southwest coast of
Papua. It includes three Malayo-Polynesian language groups:
all speakers of the Central Malayo-Polynesian language group,
South Halmahera-West New Guinea, and the southernmost
users of the Philippine language.

The initial references to the spread of non-state areas in eastern
Indonesian islands can also be seen from Spanish sources, who
arrived in Maluku after the Portuguese. Due to the Treaty
of Tordesillas in 1494, Spanish ships were prohibited from
traveling to spice sources by sailing east around Africa, which was
under Portuguese control. Therefore, many sailors volunteered
to sail west, seeking an alternative route to Maluku through
America. This mission was accomplished in the expedition led
by Ferdinand Magellan, sanctioned by Spanish King Charles V.
It departed in 1519 and is known to be the first to successfully
circumnavigate the globe. Five ships set out on this expedition.
After facing strikes and discords among the crew, some of them
reached Maluku within two years of sailing. Afterwards, they
traversed the Indian Ocean and reached the southern tip of
Africa, then returned to Spain in 1521, haunted by concerns
about the Portuguese fleet.

Three years after setting sail, out of the five ships that sailed,
one returned to the port. Out of 238 people, 18 returned. ‘The
leader of the Magellan expedition died in the Philippines after
clashing with the local population. Antonio Pigafetta, one of
those who returned, then wrote Relazione del primo viaggio

The Alifuru World | 21

intorno al mondo [Report on the First Voyage Around the
World] in 1524-1525. His work complements various early
European encounters with Maluku and helped construct the
scope of non-state areas traversed within the return route, on
which they were guided by a Ternate navigator.

To return to Spain, from Ternate Pigafetta sailed past the Bacan
and Obi Islands. From there, he stopped at Lifamatola Island,
the easternmost of the Sula Islands. Pigafetta explained: “This
island is named Sulach; its inhabitants are Gentiles, and have
not got a king. They eat human flesh; both men and women
go naked, except a piece of the bark of a tree of two fingers’

breadth before their natural parts.””°

When Pigafetta arrived, Sula Islands had been conquered by
Ternate through the colonization of Sula Besi Island. However,
some Alifuru in the interior of Taliabu Island, the largest island
in the Sula Islands, enjoyed full independence from the sangaji
[leader — Ed] appointed by Ternate. A summary of the memoir
of a Dutch officer, Pieter van Hulstijn, in 1915 stated that:

“Only a few tribes formed small settlements not
far from the coast, while most of the Alifuru tribes
lived nomadically and stayed in one place for no
more than a month. As a result, near-anarchy
almost occurred among them. It is true that the
Muslims appointed their leaders with various

titles, but they had no authority whatsoever.””!

From Sula, Pigafetta proceeded to Buru Island. “The inhabitants
[of Buru] are gentiles, and have not got a king,” he writes, and

20. Antonio Pigafetta. The First Voyage Round the World (1874),148
21. Adatrechtbundel XXIV: Groote Oost (1926), 62.

22 | The Alifuru World

“they go naked like those of Sulach.”” The Alifuru people
in the interior of Buru — in local etymology called geb fuka
(“mountain people”) -live in kinship groups called oro. Barbara
Dix Grimes (2006a117) explains that there is no centralized
political or ritual system uniting the various autonomous oro
on the island. Buru people describe this relationship through
the proverb: “each noro governs its own noro” (noro saa perinta
tu nake noro). Each noro has a leader (gaba emngaa) who is
appointed and designated by the elders, and is described as
follows:

“Because of egalitarian values in Buru culture,
leaders must operate not by ordering people
about, but by their personal charisma and ability
to persuade their kinsmen to go along with what
they suggest. Whether or not people caan (literally
“listen to,” and in an extended sense “follow/go
along with/obey”) a leader depends on his ability
to persuade them to do so. Decision making
is accomplished not by declaration of the geba
emngaa — either individually or collectively — but
by persuasion and ultimately by consensus among

all those involved in a matter.””

Aside from Banda, which “has no king,” Pigafetta also mentions
Ambon. However, it seems that Pigafetta’s description points to
Seram Island. Pigafetta explains: “It is inhabited by Moors and

Gentiles, but the former are on the sea shore, and the others in
24

the interior; these are also anthropophagi.”
22. Pigafetta, The First Voyage Round the World (1874), 149.

23. Barbara Dix Grimes.” The Return of The Bride: Affiliation and Alliance
on Buru” (thesis, The Australian National University, 1990), 21.

24. Pigafetta, The First Voyage Round the World (1874), 149.

The Alifuru World | 23

Figure 6. Alifuru Seram people with furs and jewelry, 1865-1879.

Sachse (1907: 79) states that the Alifuru leaders in Seram
“were not much different from their people. Daily, they went
out together with their subordinates to earn a living with their
own hands, and the authority they exercised was not absolute
at all.” There are several ethnic groups of Alifuru in the interior
of Seram. The most prominent in the west are the Wemale and
Alune, and in the center are the Nuaulu and Huaulu. Knaap
(1993: 252) explains that both the Wemale and Alune “do not
have a central institution that can provide them with a sense of
unity.” Meanwhile, the social unit of the Nuaulu is described as
“a consensual federation of initially separate and autonomous
groups” (Valeri, 1990: 61). The raja (kings) in Huaulu are
described as “not at all comparable or equivalent to the position
of ‘King’ in the general sense as ‘sole and absolute ruler’”

24 | The Alifuru World

(Topatimasang, 2016: 147). The same is said of the /atu of the
Wemale, who “are not ‘sole rulers’ with absolute authority over
all societal and customary matters of the Wemale community”
and are “far more democratic and egalitarian than the ‘modern’
societal order today” (/bid, 2016: 158-159). When a Dutch
East India Company commissioner went to Ambon in 1633,
he observed that the two Wemale kings he met “looked more
like beggars than nobility, let alone kings” (Knaap, 1993: 257).

Meanwhile, the easternmost tip of Seram — including the Seram
Laut and Gorom Islands, along with the mainland adjacent to
the large island — in the 1800s consisted of “a large number
of relatively autonomous domains with a similar political
organization and social structure, some large and influential in
trade and politicking...” (Roy Ellen, 2003: 91). Alfred Russel
Wallace, through The Malay Archipelago (published 1869),
describes the limited authority of the king in this place:

“In the island of Goram, only eight or ten miles
long, there are about a dozen Rajahs, scarcely
better off than the rest of the inhabitants, and
exercising a mere nominal sway, except when any
order is received from the Dutch Government,
when, being hacked by a higher power, they show
a little more strict authority.””

From Buru Island, Pigafetta proceeded to East Nusa Tenggara,
which is part of the Lesser Sunda Islands. This area stretches
from Lombok Island, bordering Bali in the west, to Timor
Island at its eastern end. The Sunda Kecil Islands had long
been suppliers of sandalwood, sulfur, and beeswax to traders

25; Wallace, The Malay Archipelago (1877), 372.

The Alifuru World | 25

from Java, Maluku, Makassar, the Philippines, and China.
Although the western part (Lombok, Sumbawa, and Bima)
had established coastal kingdoms, Hagerdal (2020: 19) states
that “Some areas of nearby Flores, Sumba, Wetar, etc. were
stateless.”

Risking a slight digression, we must take the time to discuss
this region. East Nusa Tenggara has closer ties to Maluku than
one might think. The language on Flores Island, for example, is
closer to that of Seram than to that of Sumbawa, as part of the
Central Malayo-Polynesian language family. Many settlements
in East Nusa Tenggara also claim origins from Maluku, with
the most striking example being an island named Ternate. More
importantly, the people in Southwest Maluku have stronger
cultural ties with East Nusa Tenggara than with other parts of
Maluku around the Banda Sea.

The social organization of East Nusa Tenggara society was
almost homogeneous. In most places, the inhabitants lived in
communities with formal leaders, but there were still no large
centralized institutions uniting these various communities. The
further east and south, the weaker and less felt the influence
of other Nusantara kingdoms. There were many areas in the
inter-island and interior regions that maintained their relative
autonomy amongst coastal Muslim settlements with political
and historical ties to Bima, Ternate, or Makassar.

When Pigafetta’s ship passed through this area, they were struck
by a storm and forced to stay for fifteen days in Malua [Alor].
Pigafetta wrote: “The inhabitants of this island are savages, and
more beasts than men; they eat human flesh; they go naked,
except the usual piece of bark to cover their natural parts.””° It
seems that Pigafetta is referring to the Abui tribe (which means

206. Pigafetta, The First Voyage Round the World, by Magellan (1874), 150.

26 | The Alifuru World

“mountain people”) in the interior of Alor. Hagerdal (2012:
179) states that the Alor people were mostly “...stateless tribal
groups in the highlands.” This wild impression, according to
him, is the result of the widespread slave hunting carried out by
people from other islands. These tribal groups have a fearsome
reputation for driving away attackers.

Figure 7. Alor people, circa 1900's.

Throughout their history, the Abui people maintained full
autonomy. Du Bois (194416) states that the Dutch only
appointed kings from the coastal communities in 1908. These
kings were given control over the interior areas to collect taxes
and mediate conflicts. However, “the coastal people exercised
no power over the mountain population...” and “...taxes are
still reluctantly paid.” A real conquest occurred in 1918 when
oe of the kings was killed by the Abui people. This was met with

The Alifuru World | 27

a military expedition and pressure to relocate the Abui villages
in Atimelang to areas more accessible from the coast.

Pigafetta then departed from Alor and the next day arrived at
the eastern part of Timor Island. “We had approached that part
of the island where there were some villages with their chiefs
or head men,” wrote Pigafetta. “On the other side of the island
are the dwellings of four kings, and their districts are named
Oibich, Lichsana, Suai, and Cabanaza.””” Timor consisted of
several tribes and ethnic groups that live in villages with formal
leaders. Europeans referred to these leaders as “kings” or even
“emperors,” as Europeans preferred to honor them with royal
terms. However, Hagerdal (2012: 53) states that referring
to them as “chiefs” seems more appropriate. The rulers were
indeed central components in the system, but their executive
power was usually passive and not extensive.

In 1811, the future Portuguese governor of Timor, Affonso de
Castro, stated that the island of Timor was divided into two
main tribes: the Belu in the east and the Atoni in the west. In his
report, all the Timorese villages were referred to as “kingdoms”:

“Belu comprehends 46 more or less powerful ones
[Kingdoms — Ed.], but all are free and independent
among them... The province of Servido has got 16
kingdoms, which all recognize as their superior
Senobay [Sonbai] with the title of emperor
[imperador], who is king of the Kingdom of
Serviao, from which the province has taken its
name... In that way the whole island of Timor is
divided into 62 kingdoms...”8

27. Pigafetta, The First Voyage Round the World, by Magellan (1874), 152.
28. Affonso de Castro, As possessées Portuguezas na Oceania (1867), 185.
Quoted in Hagerdal (2012), 68.

28 | The Alifuru World

Another report implied that the authority of leaders in Timor
was weak. The daily notes of Dutch East India Company
Lieutenant Jacob Pietersz van der Kerper, documenting the
journey from Kupang to Ade in East Timor, stated: “Although
there are here various chiefs and negeri, of which the one cannot
undertake anything without the consent of the others...””. In
the 1820s, a sailor whose ship wrecked in Timor even recorded:

“The sandalwood islands have neither king nor
lesser chiefs.... The highest rank is Anakoda which
means a well-off man, who is master of a large piece
of land, four or five buffalos, two horses and other
cattle, however he exercises no control over anyone
except his own servants, whose subordination only
exists in name, because master and man eat from
the same dish and work peacefully together. They
have a hereditary nobility, encompassing rich and
poor. The right conferred by this position is that
of being able to speak at council meetings, [the]
nobles [are] called “Meraboo,” which could be
translated as the elders of the people.”*°

In the eyes of Europeans, Timor was a vague and doubtful case
where small states were difficult to call states, and small kings
were difficult to call kings. These characteristics of Timor made
Hagerdal (2012: 59) refer to it as an “early-state.” But whether
the small regions in Timor should be labeled as “states” or not,
Sutherland (2021128) considers it a futile debate, as it depends

29. Dutch East India Company report quoted in Hagerdal, “A note on Ade”
(2007), 556.
30. ‘The story by the ship captain, J. Battis, published in two parts: J.D.K.

[ruseman], “Beschrijving van het Sandelhout Ei-land,” Oosterling: tijdschrift bij
uitsluiting toegewijd aan de verbreiding der kennis van Oost-Indie 2 (1835), 72-75.
Quoted in Sutherland (2021),128-129.

The Alifuru World | 29

on perspective and preference. Essentially, the political regions
in Timor are very small and decentralized.

Figure 8. Prince Afuan Thaal of Aplal, Central Timor, with his wife,
Miomaffo, circa 1898.

Lastly, before Pigafetta sailed into the Indian Ocean to return
to Europe, he received a story from the inhabitants of Timor
that a day’s journey to the northwest lay the island of Ende
[Flores]. “Its inhabitants are Gentiles, and have no king,” wrote
Pigafetta.*! It is unclear whether Pigafetta referred to the whole
island of Flores or the Ende tribe. However, Ende was part of the
six ethnic groups in Flores. The others are Manggarai, Ngada,
Lio, Sikka, and Larantuka. Before the Dutch arrived in Flores,
Manggarai and Ngada were under the influence, or perhaps

31. Pigafetta, The First voyage round the world, by Magellan (1874), 153.

30 | The Alifuru World

the power, of the Islamic sultanates in Bima (Sumbawa) and
Gowa (South Sulawesi). Ende was the seat of an independent
Muslim king allied with Bima, while the mountainous Lio
region was divided into many local political territories. In the
sixteenth century, Larantuka and the Solor Archipelago to the
east were ruled by several local kings, and the king of Larantuka
held an important position through contact and trade with the
Portuguese.

Nakagawa (1989: 33) states that the Lio Ende people were
organized into clans (ata) that were independent of each other
in terms of ritual and politics. The same can be said of the Tana
Dea people, who were divided into several autonomous sub-
units called pu’u muku/doka dea. Lewis (1988: 15) explains that
the Tana Ai people in Sikka never had an indigenous king and
“did not have or never developed a government.” The Ngada
people in Sara Sedu, according to Molnar (2002: 6), “claim to
have been autonomous and independent, and even within their
own domains the various clans occupying Sara Sedu all had
autonomy with regard to land, ritual, and political matters.”
This depiction applies to most other inland areas of Flores.

The Alifuru World | 31

Figure 9. Raga Ngole, chief of the Nage region in Ngada,
Flores, circa 1910’s.

Although the information gathered by Pigafetta did not always
come from direct observation, his notes are worth considering
as an introductory reference to the lives of the Alifuru. Pigafetta
tried to differentiate between societies that had kings and those
that did not. For example, when he discussed the Maluku
Islands, he explained: “Mutir and Machian have no king, but
are governed by the people; and when the kings of Tarenate
and Tidore are at war, they furnish them with combatants.”*
Compare this to when he described the “village head” from

Amaban in Flores, who “has only women in his service.”°?

32. Pigafetta, The First voyage round the world, by Magellan (1874), 127
33: Pigafetta, The First voyage round the world, by Magellan (1874), 151

32 | The Alifuru World

Pigafetta’s route did not extend far enough to the east. Therefore,
to complete it, we need other sources. If we turn to Halmahera,
which has been partly under the influence or control of Jailolo,
Ternate, and Tidore since the 16th century, we are to find the
same results. There are several sources to be quoted, such as
Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, who was assigned to write
about the victories in the conquests by summarizing all the
important writings and notes of the Spanish state. His official
chronicle, titled Conquista de las Islas Molucas (1609), is the
most comprehensive Spanish record of the situation in Maluku
in the 16th-17th centuries. During this time, with the help
of the Spanish, the power of Ternate-Tidore began to extend
to Halmahera Island. Although it seems that Argensola was
referring to the extinct Moro people, he described northern
Halmahera (called Bathocina) as follows:

“The inhabitants of the northern side of Bathochina
are wild people, without kings, laws, or cities, who
live in abandoned places... Each village is governed
by a Superior [Ruler] chosen by its people; they
do not pay taxes to him, but they respect his
descendants.”*

Halmahera is larger and more ethnically diverse. The
Tobelo, being the largest group on the island, traditionally
live in settlement groups (/oana), described as “internally
autonomous” (Topatimasang, 2016: 50). Meanwhile, reports
about the interior of Halmahera from the early colonial period
are hard to find. Even today, this island is the only place in
Indonesia where the interior inhabitants, commonly referred
to as Togutil (inner Tobelo), are nomadic and have survived

34, Argensola, Conquista de las Islas Molucas (1891), 70-71.

The Alifuru World | 33

despite the shrinking population due to industrial mining
disturbances. Like many anarcho-primitivist societies, they
live in small, non-hierarchical, and autonomous groups,
and because they are quite safe being at the farthest reach of
civilization, they remain stateless under the new republic,
possibly still the same as their ancestors. Until further research
is conducted, not much can be said about them.

Papua is similar to Halmahera. Northern coastal Papua has
been loosely connected with Tidore and also adopts attributes
and ranking systems. Andaya (1993) refers to this as “Tidore-
ization.” However, this does not apply to the stateless interior
Papua:

“With a few exceptions, there is no stratification
system based on rank within local groups because
it would be difficult to enforce status differences
among siblings. Therefore, there will be no
political-legal machinery like in Western states
where all authority is ultimately centralized at the
top and delegated to junior officials.”®

The above situation applies more or less to both West Papua
and Papua New Guinea. On these islands, leaders who usually
hold hereditary titles from clans or larger social formations are
described as “essentially democratic.” They differ from officials
in Western states in three ways. First, the leaders have a limited
role in decision-making due to relatively static economic and
social affairs. Second, true authority does not extend to the
judicial domain. Leaders and elders in each community do not
issue binding legal decisions. Young people sometimes ignore

35. Argensola, Conquista de las Islas Molucas (1891), 70-71.

34 | The Alifuru World

or even reject these decisions if they have different proposals.
Finally, the social scope of the leaders’ authority and influence
is very limited. They are not allowed to regulate agriculture
or other important activities or interfere in disputes outside
their local groups as this could provoke conflict with opposing
groups. The situation varies among tribes. Among the Gahuku-
Gama people in the highlands of Papua, the elders’ voices are
stronger and listened to, while the Garia elders cannot always
rely on the loyalty of followers who might move to another
settlement or leader.*°

36. Argensola, Conquista de las Islas Molucas (1891), 24-25.

Closing

From northern Halmahera, central Seram, southeastern
Tanimbar, and southwestern Flores, these non-state spaces have
been documented in early European observations. | am aware
that these various sources are cited from a very long period,
starting from the 1500s to the early 1900s. There are many
possibilities and contexts that apply to subjects from regions
that are also very vast and diverse. Therefore, I admit that in
some cases lie the tendency for major generalizations.

Despite these shortcomings, we can draw a general conclusion.
The Alifuru world was a society without centralized institutions
overseeing various groups or settlements that are autonomous
from one another. These groups and settlements were bound
only through kinship ties or alliance agreements. Each village
had various leaders and chiefs whose power is limited or
almost nonexistent. Sometimes the village chiefs were actually
creations of Ternate-Tidore or the Dutch. The ing title at times
lead to incorrect conclusions about the relatively egalitarian
and democratic nature that is contrary to real authority. Of
course, there were some exceptions, such as the hereditary titles
of tribal chiefs, social stratification, or the division of villages
that submit to a parent village. But all this does not reach a size
worthy of being called a kingdom or state. There had been no
significant difference either in appearance or wealth between
the leaders and the general members of the community. All
decisions related to public affairs were always made through
deliberations involving many people. In short, there was no
centralization of power and accumulation of wealth as in state
societies (we will discuss this further). This is what we mean by
anarchy.

CARTE PARTICULIERE DES ISLES MOLUQUES :
Fichelle de Tuewes Marines de 20 aut Degre’

Figure 10. Map of Maluku made by French cartographer Jacques-Nicolas
Bellin in 1760. Showing Ternate, Tidore, Motir, Makian and Bacan. Gilolo
[Jailolo] is the west coast of Halmahera.

State Formation in Maluku

Ancient Tales

Antonio Galvao served as the governor of the Portuguese colony
and fortress in Ternate from 1536 to 1540. During this time,
he compiled information about the inhabitants and the land
into a manuscript titled Historia das Moluccas. This manuscript
was never published and was kept as an archive in Seville. It was
only discovered and translated into English in 1970, under the
title A Treatise on the Moluccas.

During Galvao’s time, Maluku was a reference to the five small
clove-producing islands in northern Maluku (Ternate, Tidore,
Moti, Makian, and Bacan). In his work, Galvao explained
that four of them, “was independent [senhorio], territory
[camarqua], and boundaries [demarcagao]. They lived together
in communities, but everyone at his own convenience. They
were ruled by the voices of the eldest, of whom one was not
better than the other.” However, he added that “they used to
have neither law nor king...”*” The story of the coronation of
the first king of Bacan has been recorded by Galvao:

“Once long ago there were no kings and the people
lived in kinship groups (Port., parentela) governed
by elders. Since “no one was better than the
other,” dissension and wars arose, alliances made
and broken, and people killed or captured and
ransomed. In time some became more powerful
than others, captains and governors were created,

37. Jacobs, Hubert (ed. & trans.). A Treatise on the Moluccas (1971), 74,76.

38 | Ancient Tales

but there were still no kings. One day a prominent
elder of the island, named Bikusagara, went sailing
on a kora-kora [a local double-outrigger vessel).
He spied a clump of beautiful rattan growing near
a precipice by the sea and sent his men ashore to
cut some stalks. When they arrived at the spot, the
rattan was nowhere to be seen, and so they returned
to the korakora. Exasperated, Bikusagara himself
went ashore and immediately located the clump of
rattan. He ordered his men to cut down some of the
stalks, but as soon as they started to hack into the
rattan, blood gushed forth from the cuts. Startled
by this strange phenomenon, Bikusagara jumped
back and noticed nearby four naga [serpent) eggs
hidden among the rocks. When he approached
these eggs he heard a voice ordering him to take
the eggs home with him because from them would
emerge individuals of great distinction. Mindful
of the command Bikusagara carefully placed the
eggs in a totombo [a rattan box) and brought
them home where they were guarded with great
care. After some time the eggs brought forth three
males and a female. When they grew up one of
the men became the king of Bacan, the second the
king of the Papuas, the third the king of Butung
and Banggai, and the woman became the wife
of the king of Loloda. From these original four
descended all the kings of these islands”**

38. Jacobs, Hubert (ed.& trans.). A Treatise on the Moluccas (1971), 81-83.
Entirely cited from Andaya, The World of Maluku (1993), 53.

Ancient Tales | 39

According to Andaya (1993248), the Maluku society was
almost untouched by Indian or Islamic cultural ideas at the
time of the European arrival in 1512. However, the striking
similarities between the story of Sagara and the Indian epic
Mahabharata undeniably suggest that the story of Bikusagara
is a legacy from the Hindu-Buddhist era in Maluku, possibly
contemporaneous with the Majapahit era. The absorption
and adaptation of the Sagara story in the Bacan chronicles
indicate that the earliest state formation in this region had been
influenced by traders from Indianized Javanese kingdoms.

During Galvao’s time, Bacan, Papua, Buton-Banggai, and
Loloda were not politically significant. Bartolomé Leonardo de
Argensola noted that some of the earliest Maluku kingdoms in
Halmahera had diminished in power: “Batochina [Halmahera]
is about 250 leagues in circumference, and subject to two kings;
Xilolo [Jailolo] and Lolada. The latter was once the center of
all Maluku, throughout the entire sea, and was previously the
strongest; but now it is weak.” On the contrary, Ternate-
Tidore, who emerged as the two main powers in Maluku,
drew inspiration or influence from Java as can be found in the
Ternate tales recorded in Francois Valentyn’s work titled Oud en
Nieuw Oost-Indien (The Old and New East Indies), published
in Amsterdam between 1724-1726:

“In the beginning the island [of Ternate] was
undeveloped and only very lightly populated. The
earliest settlement was Tobona, which was located
on the top of the mountain and founded by a
headman called Cuna. One day as Cuna went to
the forests to tap the sugar palm to make toddy
(tuak), he came across a golden mortar and pestle.

39: Argensola, Conquista de las Islas Molucas (1891), 70.

40 | Ancient Tales

He brought it back to the village, and it soon
became an object of great curiosity. So many people
came to see this remarkable phenomenon that he
could no longer cope. He therefore decided to give
it to Momole Matiti, who was head of the village
of Foramadiahi, halfway down the mountain.
Once Momole Matiti accepted the unusual object,
he too was besieged with visitors so that he in
turn gave it to Cico, head of the coastal village
of Sampalu. Although many came to Sampalu to
view the golden mortar and pestle, Cico was able
to deal with them admirably and was honored by
all the other heads of the island. He was therefore

asked to become the principal head with the title
of kolano, or lord.”

According to Andaya (1993: 50), the golden pestle and mortar
are metaphors for the wealth brought by cloves. This story
explains the process by which the demand for cloves prompted
the relocation of the main settlement from the mountain peak
to the coast. Andaya compares it to a similar tale from Tidore
recorded by Joao de Barros, in which the inhabitants who had
been living on Mount Mareku eventually moved to the coast
because many foreign traders arrived in search of cloves. Spices
attracted traders and foreigners to Ternate, and these arrivals
to some extent must have aided the reorganization of Maluku
society with the appointment of the first rulers. Kolano title
itself does not originate from Maluku language but is instead
a loanword from Javanese language, ‘Klono Sewandono
[Kelana], an antagonistic king from a foreign land in the Panji
tales from East Java.

40. Valentijn, Oud en Nieuw (1862), vol.1, pp. 282-283, 81-83. Entirely
cited from The World of Maluku (1993), 50.

Expansion and Conquest | 41

Five main kingdoms once stood in northern Maluku: Bacan,
Loloda, Jailolo, Tidore, and Ternate. Lores concerning the
origins of these kingdoms are abundant in their variety, almost
all of which, either explicitly or implicitly, indicate foreign
origins of the kings and the power they wielded. A relatively
more recent tradition, emerging after the arrival of Islam,
mentions the arrival of an Arab named Jafar Sadek in Ternate
as well. Following the appointment of the first kings, the state
gradually formed. Rulers of Maluku began to embrace Islam at
the end of the 15th century. This affirmed the noble status of
kolano, whose title changed to su/tan. Both Ternate and Tidore
also created new Islamic-influenced positions, such as hukum
(legal officers) and syahbandar (harbormasters).

Embracing Islam brought economic advantages as Islamic
kingdoms in western Nusantara, India, and the Middle East
promised to supply trade goods and military support to the
new Islamic kingdoms in the region.

Conversion to Islam was the first step in state formation, but
it was not sufficient for centralizing power, let alone creating
a relatively stable and extensive territory. The centralization of
power was more influenced by the presence of Europeans, and
therefore, we need to discuss the chronology of their presence.

Expansion and Conquest

After being formally accepted in Ternate in 1512, Portugal
built a fort there the following year. Spain attempted to defeat
Portugal and repeatedly sent military expeditions (1525, 1529,
and 1542), all of which failed. Spain’s final attempt in 1564
succeeded in conquering the Philippines, making Maluku an
outermost post. After the unification of Spanish and Portuguese

42 | Expansion and Conquest

crowns in 1580 and the conquest of Ternate in 1606, Spain
began its brief period of control over Maluku. The English
left Ambon in 1623, and Spain subsequently lost its efforts
to dominate Maluku against the Dutch, deciding to withdraw
completely in 1666. This left the Dutch as the only European
nation able to remain in Maluku until the mid-20th century.

During the transition of European power from Portugal to the
Netherlands, the Sultanate of Ternate-Tidore expanded and
strengthened. The process was gradual. When the Portuguese
arrived in Ternate in 1512, the ruler of Ternate was a primus
inter pares [first among equals], ruling mainly with the consent
of local leaders. Power of Ternate palace was balanced by the
fala raha (four families) nobles, comprising the Tomagola,
Tomaitu, Marsaoli, and Limatahu families. Although the fala
raha benefited from the rapidly increasing income from clove
trade, a larger share of the wealth flowed to the Sultan. This
marks the beginning of the accumulation of wealth by the
sultans.

The European demand for spices introduced a fundamental
change in indigenous trade that benefited the rulers. Initially,
as Andaya (1993: 56) explains, each village in northern Maluku
had its own clove tree area, and each family considered the trees
as their property, harvesting cloves by snapping off branches
that had cloves attached to them, placing them in baskets, and
offering them to traders in exchange for foreign goods. Similar
simple management of the nutmeg commodity could also be
found in Banda.“

41, “Everyone gathers [nutmeg] as much as they can, because it is all common
property, and no labor is applied to the trees, but nature is left to do its own work.”
— Varthema, Itinerario de Ludouico de Varthema Bolognese (1523), XXXII

Expansion and Conquest | 43

a

“Jente que abiranas ilbas dermaluce sao
Zin fies Chamaese malucrs: desley thas
“view Socrano —_

Figure 11. A Portuguese watercolor painting circa 1540, found in the
Cédice Casanatense, depicts the people of Maluku [north].

The Portuguese demanded larger quantities and better-quality
cloves. Hence, a societal reorganization was implemented for
collection, storage, and sale of spices. Common people were
organized to gather cloves for rulers, and profits from trade
were distributed through rulers to people in the form of gold,
copper gongs, gems, ivory, porcelain, silk, and cotton cloth.
In this arrangement, only rulers held crucial intermediary
positions to oversee such reorganization.

By mid-17th century, the intensity of international trade
had created a growing disparity between rulers and people.
Consequently, rulers were able to purchase highly desired
items (iron, cloth, and weaponry) from Europeans and other
foreign traders. People’s growing dependence on the rulers’
monopolistic access to these goods gradually enhanced the
latters’ influence over society more than before.

44 | Expansion and Conquest

European nations helped reinforce the position of Maluku
rulers with their specific ideas about the ideal royal authority.
Among all European nations, the Dutch had the most enduring
and lasting impact on Maluku’s indigenous society. Andaya
explains that in the 17th century, the Dutch played a role in
centralizing power and benefited from this. Europeans believed
that northern Maluku rulers had privileges and powers similar
to other European kingdoms, as they sought to make direct
economic and political agreements with northern Maluku rulers:

“They understood a powerful ruler and found it
more convenient to deal with a single individual
instead of an entire council. A king with power
could sign treaties, make quick decisions, and be
manipulated much more easily than a government
operating on the basis of consensus. The Dutch
were therefore more than happy to support a
strong kingship.””

These changes were most evident during the reign of Sultan
Hamzah (1627-1648), who lived in Manila for 20 years after
being taken by the Spanish. According to Andaya (1993:
161), he was influenced by various Spanish ideas about proper
authority and ruler strength. Hamzah was responsible for
transforming Ternate’s governance, relying heavily on military
force and the collection of “fines” from conquered territories
rather than traditional relationships such as marriage, gifts,
and persuasion. During Sultan Hamzalh’s reign, Ternate almost
resembled a typical European kingdom, with decision-making
centralized around him rather than through deliberation and
consultation with elders.

42. Andaya, The World of Maluku (1993), 179.

Expansion and Conquest | 45

Against the background of mid-16th century international trade
evolution that facilitated the sultan’s manipulation of resources,
Sultan Ternate consolidated his position in the palace and
initiated an expansion through colonization and apanages to the
west and north. Sultan Ternate sought to ensure the loyalty of
noble families by “encouraging” them to undertake expeditions
beyond the islands. This was also done to tame any potential
challenges from the fala raha. Noble families waged wars and
conquered other islands, ruling them on behalf of Ternate.

The first colonization by Ternate appears to have been carried
out by the Tomaitu family, who conquered and established
a colony in Sula Besi, the second-largest island in the Sula
Islands, in 1488.*° The Tomagola family conquered Buru Island
in 1511. From Buru Island, the Tomagola family branch under
Samarau’s leadership also extended its influence to Seram,
Seram Laut, Saparua, Haruku, Ambalau, Manipa, Ambon,
and Kelang between 1523-1524. By the 1660s, Ternate
had conquered Tobunku, Banggai, Buton, and surrounding
islands in Sulawesi, receiving annual and semi-annual tributes
from northern Sulawesi, Saparua, and Buton. The peak was
the Bungaya Treaty of 1667, where Ternate received territorial
rewards for helping the Dutch defeat the Gowa Kingdom.
Dutch recognized Ternate’s territories, including settlements in
North Sulawesi up to Mindanao in the Philippines, Tomini Bay
from Gorontalo and Limbotto to the west as far as Kaili and
Palu, Obi Island, the Sula Islands, Banggai, Tobunku, Tibore,
Selayar, the westernmost islands under Ternate’s control, and
Batochina (North Halmahera).

43. Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién (1724), Vol. 1, 88. Valentijn records
several expansions of Ternate’s kolano, complete with dates, which can be traced
back to 1330. While the validation of these dates is somewhat questionable, I only
cite expansions that took place a few decades before the arrival of Europeans.

44, Valentijn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién (1724), Vol. 1, 96.

46 | Expansion and Conquest

Meanwhile, Tidore seemed content with the recognition and
submission of indigenous leaders from eastern and southern
regions, ranging from Gamrange to Raja Ampat. Various
documents and tales provide different versions of Tidore’s
territorial expansion. However, it can be summarized that in
the mid-15th century, during the leadership of either Sultan
Mansur or his successor, Sultan Jamaluddin, a Papuan knight
from Biak or Waigeo named Gurabesi pledged his allegiance to
Tidore. He conquered the Raja Ampat Islands and the coast of
Papua under Tidore’s control. This was also made possible with
the assistance of the Gamrange people from the settlements of
Patani, Maba, and Weda in southeastern Halmahera, who had
recognized Tidore’s authority earlier. Other sources state that
Tidore, with the help of the Gamrange, defeated the ruler of
Gebe Island, who had influence and power over Papua in the
late 15th century. By conquering Gebe, Tidore also conquered
Papua,”

45. Van der Crab, Reizen naar Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea (1879), 19.

Expansion and Conquest | 47

Figure 12. Ternate soldiers in the early 17th century.
Artwork by Georg Franz Miiller.

The creation of a centralized hierarchy not only resulted
from conquest but also from voluntary submission. The most
evident motivation for groups taking up that initiative had
been the need for protection. For instance, in the 16th century,
the Watan Lema (Five Beaches) alliance settlement in Solor
once requested Sultan Ternate to send his relative to become
the king in Solor and sought Ternate’s protection against the
Portuguese. This was a rather rare case because, aside from the
need for protection, many settlements in Solor were actually
populated by Muslim immigrants from Maluku, in particular
Seram-Gorom (see Dietrich, 1984).

48 | Expansion and Conquest

Conquered territories of Ternate and Tidore provided tributes
periodically in the form of valuable commodities, such as
Cendrawasih (birds of paradise). These birds were highly
coveted for their beautiful feathers and were sent as tributes
from the eastern islands to the rulers of northern Maluku, who
sold them for significant profits to foreign traders. Sago was
one of the main tributes collected by Ternate from Banggai,
the Sula Islands, to Moro. ‘The primary product of Taliabu and
Mangole in the Sula Islands was sago baked into hard biscuits,
which were one of the products routinely sent as tribute to the
Sultan of Ternate. Alifuru slaves from the interior of Taliabu
were another valuable contribution from this island to Ternate.
The Gamrange people in southeastern Halmahera and Raja
Ampat islands in Papua were the most important for Tidore,
providing tributes in the form of ambergris or whale vomit,
turtle shells, Cendrawasih (birds of paradise), slaves, and spices.

In addition to tributes, many areas were required to provide
labor or participate in military expeditions if summoned. by
the Sultan. Tobaru people in Halmahera were Ternate’s most
reliable and feared troops. Meanwhile, the Gamrange and
the people of Papua were Tidore’s most important subjects
in the peripheral regions. They had a large number of strong
men whose maritime skills and ferocity in battle were well-
documented.

Sultan Tidore employed utusan (envoys) to visit various
outlying regions under Tidore’s control and collect tributes. If
these tributes (which could include slaves or other items with
values equivalent to masoi bark, nutmeg, turtle shells, or other
goods) were not fulfilled, punitive hongi expeditions would
be launched in the name of Sultan Tidore, usually by other
kings in the regions under his leadership. Ternate was far more
capable than Tidore in conducting hongi expeditions.

Expansion and Conquest | 49

Figure 13. A Ternate kora-kora as depicted in a Dutch publication
from 1601.

This was not a unilateral submission. Most regions that
pledged loyalty to Ternate-Tidore received benefits, especially
among their leaders. Coastal rulers in Papua gained access to
valuable goods from Tidore, such as iron tools, weapons, and
cloth, which were highly prized by the inland communities.
This provided them with significant influence over the inland
Papuans (Andaya, 1993108). When Resident de Clercq visited
Berau Bay in Papua in the late 19th century, he reported:
“All these places have Papuans under them, who live in the
mountains, and who sell nutmegs, massoi and sometimes a few
bird skins to the Muslim coastal groups. They are under their

tribal leaders but acknowledge the authority of the Muslim
chiefs.”“°

46. de Clercq, De West-en Noordkust (1893), 128-129. Quoted in Sutherland
(2021), 92.

50 | Expansion and Conquest

Moreover, Papuan people believed that the primary purpose
of tribute missions to Tidore was to obtain titles. Tribal chiefs
were granted prestigious titles such as raja, kolano, jojau, and
kapita laut or their local variations. In turn, they appointed
subordinates in their communities to receive other “foreign”
titles like sangaji, gimalaha, and sowohi. These titles were
believed to transfer the Sultan’s sacred power. This applied not
only to status but also to clothing and other items bestowed
by the Sultan. Title bestowals were also conducted by Ternate
in regions that reaffirmed their relations with the former. For
instance, during the reign of Sultan Amsterdam, Ternate visited
North Sulawesi, which was considered “problematic.” There
the Sultan presented Indian clothing and conferred the title of
raja on various tribal chiefs.

During the growth of these Ternate-Tidore kingdom, local leaders
across eastern Indonesia were granted 7aja grand titles, which to
this day sometimes still mistakenly perceived as actual kingdoms.
Andaya (1993107) explained that “The adoption of foreign titles
did not indicate a shift to a more centralized hierarchical structure,
but rather a way of distinguishing the major chiefs of a particular
island or the most important leaders within one community.”

It is important to note that Ternate-Tidore’s recognition or
influence was not the determinant for the shape of the Sultanate’s
state structure; and cannot be equated with the structure of modern
nation-states. We often imagine the Sultanate’ territorial authority
on a map with dotted boundary lines. Such depictions frequently
create the impression and misinterpretation that the authority of
the Sultanate or the colonial Dutch East Indies was indeed that
strong within the enclosed lines. However, this obscures the types
and nature of power relationships, which were more complex and
diverse in practice.

Center — Periphery Relationship | 51

Center — Periphery Relationship

The central control of the kingdom in North Maluku over its
territories did not operate evenly across all areas. As explained
by Sutherland (2021122), they “claimed power over vast
territories, although through fragile chains of authority.” The
Tomagola and Tomaitu families governed the Sula Islands,
Buru, and the Hoamoal Peninsula independently on behalf of
Ternate. They were moving towards becoming the new centers
of power, especially the Tomagola family whose lands were
filled with clove and nutmeg forests and were quite distant
from Ternate. This gave them great freedom in governance
and participation in the secret spice trade. When dealing
directly with Western traders, especially from Makassar, the
Tomagola family avoided paying taxes to the Sultan of Ternate
and consented to having low, fixed prices for their goods.
Meanwhile, some regions like Banggai, Buton, and Jailolo had
formerly been great kingdoms with significant regional roles
and whose status remained respected.

‘The effective and real control of Ternate and Tidore was limited
to their own islands. Meanwhile, in the peripheral regions, their
relationships were not always stable and varied from one area
to another. The authority of Ternate and Tidore in Halmahera,
Seram, and Papua, at least, were not always able to reach inland
areas inhabited by the Alifuru. They merely conquered, gain
recognition or respect, and this at times were facilitated by the
presence of Muslim trading villages along the coast.

52 | Center — Periphery Relationship

tie” -
a”

East of Greenwich

DQ ese o© B&

Former Islands formerly

Residence of Former pons possessions Kingdom divided between

Ternate. of Terna’ of Tidor. of Batjan. Ternate and Tidor.
800 Miles.

Figure 14. The power of Ternate-Tidore shaded on a map, from
The Universal Geography (1885) book by Elisée Reclus.

For much of its history before Dutch rule, Banda maintained
its independence and a dignified relationship with Ternate.
Ternate Kingdom claimed that Banda was under its authority.
However, according to Villiers (1981), this control was
sporadic and minimal, limited to small tributes and tariffs
imposed by Ternate’s emissaries, who collected and managed
some spices and controlled the port. The Portuguese colonial
governor Antonio de Brito made an agreement in 1512
directly with the Banda elders rather than with the Sultanate of
Ternate, indicating Banda’s sovereignty over its own affairs. The

Center — Periphery Relationship 15S

Portuguese chronicler Duarte Barbosa in his work completed
in 1518 also stated: “There is no King in these Islands, and they
are subject to none, but sometimes they submit to the King of
47

Maluquo.”

Since the arrival of Europeans, Halmahera has been divided
into territories under the control of Ternate, Tidore, and
Jailolo. With the destruction of Jailolo in 1620 by Ternate and
Portuguese forces, most of central and northern Halmahera
fell under Ternate’s rule, while southeastern Halmahera in
Gamrange recognised Tidore’s authority. However, Platenkamp
(1984: 169) stated that “Ternate’s political control did not
extend to the inland [Tobelo] groups.”

Sahu people in northern Halmahera were considered more
fortunate until a few years ago because, compared to the Tobelo,
they retained much of their cultural base. Perhaps their smaller
population was a factor in why the Sultan of Ternate did not
intervene intensively. Additionally, the Sahu preferred cultural
ties with Jailolo, a state that had dissolved at the peak of the
Ternate-Tidore Sultanate’s glory. “It can be assumed that the
Sultan of Jailolo likely did not have full control over the Sahu
territory and people, making the Sahu region and community
fully autonomous in managing themselves according to their
customary laws” (see Topatimasang, 2016: 78).

A similar situation existed in the interior of the Sula Islands,
which were inhabited by several major Alifuru tribes, such
as the Kedai in Mongole, as well as the Mange and Seboyu
in Taliabu. The Kedai had obligations to Ternate and hunted
turtles around Sula Besi. However, the Mange, who lived
nomadically in small groups in the western highlands of inland
Taliabu, were described in relatively recent Dutch records as

47. Duerte Barbosa. The Book of Duarte Barbosa, Vol.2 (1921), 198. ‘Islands’
refers to Banda, while ‘Maluquo’ refers to Ternate.

54 Center — Periphery Relationship

“not recognizing any authority and refusing to pay taxes to the

Sultan,”*?

The authority of Tidore also did not extend to the communities
of Southeast Seram and Seram Laut, which were each connected
through various alliances that changed over time. Although
Tidore claimed authority over this region, Roy Ellen (1987:
57) stated that they “had little influence.” Roy Ellen (2003: 88)
also noted that Tidore’s influence was “weak along the south
coast of Teluk Berau and along the Onin coast.” He further
commented:

“In practice, as far as the Onin region was concerned,
the sultan of Tidore had no direct power at all, and
the only effective indirect influence was through
the quasi-client domain of Misool, the ruler of
which he was expected to inform before taking
any actions with respect to the local people.” (Roy
Ellen, 2003: 124).

Peripheral sovereignty (Alifuru) continued to challenge
emerging centers of power in Ambon until at least the early
20th century. The Portuguese fort in Ambon was taken over by
the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1605, followed by
Jayakarta (later renamed Batavia) in 1619. During this time,
the Dutch presence was primarily as traders occasionally bound
by agreements. The conquest of Banda marked the beginning
of the first open colonial government in the archipelago under
the VOC, who later moved its capital from Ambon to Batavia.
The Dutch East Indies government was established after the
Dutch East India Company was dissolved in 1799.

48. Adatrechtbundel XXIV: Groote Oost (1926), 62.

Center — Periphery Relationship | 55

Despite this, the centralization of power did not always
proceed smoothly, largely due to limited human resources
for superintendence. On islands deemed economically “less
strategic,” the inhabitants were only asked to swear allegiance,
and their chiefs were appointed as officials. After this, the Dutch
sometimes visited every few years or not at all. Consequently,
most areas maintained their relative autonomy as before due to
the de facto absence of colonial authority.

For instance, in late 1874, Italian explorer G. Emilio Cerutti
reported to Dutch authorities that although Aru and Kei were
claimed in the name of the Dutch crown and occasionally
visited by the Resident in Ambon, they were actually quite
autonomous in trade and politics.” Dutch ship captain
Dirk Hendrik Kolff also lamented this issue decades earlier:
“For many years since the inhabitants of the Arru Islands
have been uncontrolled by Europeans, and have been without
Christian instructors, so that they have advanced but little in
civilization.” He explained about Lakor Island:

“This island was formerly under subjection to Moa, and
the Orang Tua resorted to it occasionally, to offer homage
to the representatives of the Dutch Government there;
but now every igri, or small district, was under its own
government, and perfectly independent of the chiefs of
Moa. Neither the Dutch East India Company, nor the

Government, ever had a garrison on Lakor.””!

49. See Ellen, On the Edge of the Banda Zone (2003), 116.
50. Kolff, Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga (1840), 171. ‘Arrv here refers to Aru.
51. Kolff, Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga (1840), 109-110.

56 Center — Periphery Relationship

Some areas of the Maluku Islands were only nominally under
the control of the Dutch East India Company on paper or
maps until early 20th century. It was only then that the Dutch
East Indies government gradually succeeded in deploying
more missionaries and establishing guard posts on key islands.
Without these measures, there was no guarantee of effective
authority. This dynamic was observed by Kolff during his visit
to Damar Island in southwest Maluku:

“For thirty years, they had not encountered a
single Dutch person. Their island was rarely visited
by trading ships, and the Christian population
was nearly extinct. Due to the lack of regular
governance and the absence of education for the
youth, the community had reverted to its original
state of ignorance and barbarism.””

As the Dutch gradually began to organize the interior of
Seram, Alifuru leaders were appointed by the Dutch and
given titles such as raja, patih, or orang kaya. However, Sachse
(190779) explains that the residents often did not fulfill their
corvée labor obligations to the chiefs, creating administrative
problems because these chiefs did not receive wages from the
government. Maartin Manse (2021: 525) describes the interior
of Seram as a ‘stateless space” that had long “remained untouched
by colonialism.”

In a different context, Sutherland (2021: 129) explains that the
eastern part of Flores “remain unincorporated” into the state.
Throughout its history, despite the political realities, Ata Tana
Ai (upland Sikka) recognized the idea and principle that Tana

52. Kolff, Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga (1840), 94.

Center — Periphery Relationship | 57

Ai was ruled by a king. However, with the actual absence of
political authority, Lewis (1988: 14) stated that “the region of
Tana Ai was essentially independent for most of its history.”
Additionally, in 1907, Dutch administrator De Vries also
complained about the interior of Ende:

“\.the influence of our (Dutch) government did
not go further than the vicinity of (the town of)
Ende... The controleur also gave the headmen
of the nearby mountain-villages to understand,
with emphasis, that their villages had to be tidy,
the paths had to be maintained etc., in short,
all the ordinary things, to which these headmen
had never listened... They did not consider the
“Compagnie” as their master.””

Even in regions that clearly acknowledged state sovereignty —
not far from the periphery and close to the center — there was
significant tendency towards non-compliance. For example,
Andaya (1993: 100) cited Dutch East India Company reports
during the joint Tidore and Dutch clove tree destruction
expedition to Maba, which was met with hostility. Although
they recognized their guests from Tidore, the people of Maba
cursed the Patani people for bringing the Dutch into their
territory. “When after repeated conferences the Tidore envoy in
exas- peration asked whether they no longer wished to obey the
Sultan Tidore and to return once again to a situation without
a king, their reply was to make an obscene gesture by striking
their genitalia, screaming, and shooting off a volley of arrows.”
53. Vries, J.J.de. Memorie van Overgave van de Onderafdeeling Zuid-Flores door

de civiele gezaghebber (1910), 46-47. Quoted in Nakagawa, The Social Organization
of The Endenese of Central Flores (1989), 45.

58 | Political Fugitives and Refugees

In such situations, the capacity of the periphery to challenge
the central status of Ternate-Tidore was very high. Rebellion,
desertion, migration, or shifting loyalty from one power to
another occurred whenever rulers acted harshly or when
opportunities (or allies) were available at the right time. The
process of annexing non-state spaces under the authority of
ancient and colonial states left a lasting negative impression,
manifesting in various cultural expressions in several places in
Maluku.

Political Fugitives and Refugees

The conquest of Banda was the first massacre committed by
Europeans in Southeast Asia, marking a new era in the eastern
Indonesian archipelago. At that time, the Dutch East India
Company (VOC) brutally massacred the Banda people in
1621. At least 44 orang kaya were beheaded, and out of 15,000
inhabitants, only 1,000 survived to live as slaves. Those who
managed to escape fled to Makassar, Seram, and the Kei Islands.
Since then, native Banda people have become extinct, and the
island inhabited by slaves who ran Dutch-owned plantations.

A similarly extreme case occurred with the Moro people in
North Halmahera, as studied by Villiers (1988) and Platenkamp
(1993). The Moro were inhabitants of two areas known as land
Moro (moro-tia) and sea Moro (moro-tai) on Morotai Island.
It is unknown whether the Moro people are the same ethnic
group as the Moro in Mindanao, Philippines. Platenkamp
(1993), from his mythological study, concluded that they are
still part of the Tobelo. Their presence was recorded during the
Portuguese and Spanish periods through missionary activities
in this region, but they vanished from Dutch records and now
exist only as a myth among Halmahera people.

Political Fugitives and Refugees | 59

Like the Banda people, the Moro people also became extinct
—as result of prolonged and harsh conflicts among the Jailolo,
Ternate, and Tidore kingdoms, which divided the Moro region.
The Moro people, who were rich in rice, sago, pigs, and chickens,
were obliged to provide food supplies, most of which flowed to
Ternate. Upon the arrival of the Europeans, Moro had a sangaji
who appears to have been appointed by Ternate. They quickly
embraced Christianity as a means to avoid further oppression and
to gain protection from the Portuguese, who provided them with
clothing, sent priests, and established defenses in Mamuya, one
of the main Moro villages. This disrupted the tribute relationship
with Ternate, as afterward, the Moro settlements refused to
supply provisions to Ternate. In this case, Moro evidently made
a decision that made them easy targets for plundering by their
Muslim neighbors. In 1606, the Portuguese were expelled from
the Maluku Islands. Moro received virtually no protection
until the Spanish decided to station troops there. The Spanish
chronicler, Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, in “Conquista de
las Islas Molucas” (1609), wrote:

“Only the Momoya [Mamuya] village is warlike:
without law, money, measures, coins, gold, silver,
or any other metals, and without a king; but filled
with supplies, weapons, deity, and devils that speak
from within. The Kings of Malucco [Maluku]
conquered them, and each person kept what they
could; the best parts belonged to Ternate and were
given to the King of Tidore, all this power was
magnified by the strength of Spain.”

54. Argensola, Conquista de las Islas Molucas (1891), 70-71.

60 | Political Fugitives and Refugees

Moro people experienced three forced displacements and were
enslaved to Ternate in the 17th century. In 1614, Ternate
captured Moro refugees from Tolo. Subsequently, part of the
Morotai population was sent to Tidore, and the other half to
Ternate. This practically led to the extinction of Moro people
and their trace disappeared from historical records until their
land was eventually inhabited by the Tobelo people today.
rn ae ’

randes orpos chamar se” bo tachinas
“Jintws
<

Figure 15. Portuguese watercolor c.1540 in the Cédice Casanatense,
depicting people in Batochina [Halmahera].

According to Platenkamp (1993), the Tobelo community has
maintained a collective memory of the existence of the Moro
society that existed four centuries ago by incorporating them
into the cosmological concept of a hidden world. Tobelo
people have a legend about invisible beings called “the true
inhabitants” (moroka), whose territory they now occupy. In
Tobelo mythology, as explained by Platenkamp, Ternate is
the source of violence, representing an agent that repeatedly
persuades the Tobelo community to leave the protection of the

Political Fugitives and Refugees | 61

forest and accept Ternate as their master. On multiple occasions,
the Tobelo community moved to the coast and then retreated
into the forest, oscillating between the coastal settlements that
are “orderly” and “visible” to Ternate, or choosing to stay in
the forest, hidden from the view of Ternate, disappearing “like
moroka.” In other words, a world to “escape.”

It is not surprising that most contemporary ethnographic
literature about various inland Halmahera societies refers to
groups who fled from the formation of enslaving states, which
levied taxes and tributes, and occasionally conducted massacres
during multiple eras. Sometimes, they are also believed to be
descendants of defeated groups and political refugees. For
instance, it is said that there are still Lingon people with white
skin and blue eyes in the interior of Halmahera, believed to
be descendants of Portuguese sailors and soldiers who were
defeated by the Dutch-Ternate coalition and possibly fled with
Tidore or Makian people (Topatimasang, 2016: 85). lam more
inclined to believe that Lingon people are descendants of the
Moro and their Portuguese (or Spanish) allies who survived
and fled inland. Therefore, the legend of Moro spirits preserved
by Tobelo people has historical roots.

Halmahera is not a homogeneous island, as there are several
language groups and much intermingling, indicating that
the Halmahera people are essentially divided into several
distinct ethnic groups. Some cases resulted from local political
dynamics. For instance, the Dano (Baba) Hassan rebels, who
failed to reestablish the Jailolo Kingdom in the late 19th
century, fled eastward and reached the oldest Tobelo settlement
centers (Topatimasang, 2016: 49). Additionally, the Modole
people in central Halmahera are also described:

62 | Political Fugitives and Refugees

“[...] the reason they migrated from their original
place in the north is a local legend that states they
fled because they refused to pay the taxes imposed
by the Dutch through the Sultan of Ternate at
that time. Like the inland Tobelo people elsewhere
in the northern and central peninsulas, the best
way to avoid these burdensome regulations was
to escape into the deeper forest areas that [by]
de facto completely beyond Ternate’s control”
(Topatimasang, 2016: 88).

Similar stories can be found in many inland or highland areas
of the main islands in Maluku. According to folklore in Bacan,
“yakis [long-tailed monkeys] were people cursed by the Sultan of
Bacan for refusing to pay taxes, and then turned into monkeys
and driven into the forest” (Topatimasang, 2016: 109).

In Kei Islands, the term dolo-ternat law (Jailolo-Ternate) carries
a negative connotation. It represents a dark and early period
of life in Kei Islands, conceptually as a period at the “edge of
Jailolo, the border of Ternate” (Dolo soin Ternat wahan), marked
by lawlessness, murder, plundering, and incitements. With the
arrival of immigrants from Bali, Kei community organized
themselves based on the most formal law in Maluku, known as
larvul-ngabal (Thorburn, 1998: 59). Larvul-ngabal appears to
date back to a period older than the Jailolo or Ternate kingdoms,
originating from the Majapahit era in the 14th to 16th centuries.
Therefore, the phrase “Jailolo-Ternate law” refers to the tyranny
and cruelty of Ternate over the regions under its control, but it
was used to distinguish the period of political refugees’ arrival
during the collapse of Majapahit, or an alternative version of the
Kediri-Singosari upheaval (Hukubun, 2023: 476-477).

Political Fugitives and Refugees [63

The evidence I have outlined shows that escaping and seeking
refuge were still possible, as the tentacles of ancient and colonial
state power were not all-reaching, especially in the interior of
large islands such as Halmahera, Seram, or the smaller stateless
islands in the south. Despite being more maritime, Maluku
Islands had a situation very similar to the depiction of stateless
societies in mainland Asia.

In his study The Art of Not Being Governed (2009) on stateless
societies in the highlands of Southeast Asia, James C. Scott
explains that the area was not only a resistance zone, but also a
protection zone, which he called “zones of refuge.” This means,
most of the hill populations for more than a millennium and
half had come there to avoid various impacts of state formation
projects in the lowlands. They were not “left behind” by the
progress of civilization in the valleys, rather “over long periods
of time, chosen to place themselves out of the reach of the
state” (Scott, 2009: 22).

The Alifuru people in the interior of Buru were also once obliged
to pay tribute in the form of tobacco, rice, sweet potatoes, millet,
coconuts, and sago, as well as mandatory rotating labor for the
coastal Muslim kings who gained legitimacy from Ternate’s
supremacy and Islam. For the Alifuru in Buru, as Grimes writes
(2006b: 147), this arrangement was unpleasant, and “the
burden of tribute is still remembered today.” Regarding the
people in the interior of Buru, it is explained “the native people
of Buru, referred to as Hindus or backward people, lived in the
mountains, refusing to be governed or colonized by the Dutch.

They were free people. They were not evil!” (Topatimasang,
2016: 119).

Seram presents the most striking case study because it is among
the stateless areas considered to have been lacking in economic

64 | Political Fugitives and Refugees

resources or opportunities for state development and taxation.
Its mountainous and densely forested interior remained
uncharted territory (terra incognita) for Europeans, recognized
as a haven for rebels, pirates, and other state fugitives (Maanse,
2021: 525). In the 1865s, the Dutch government attempted to
implement egeri state taxes, provoking a full-scale rebellion.
The head of soa Tanunu declared that his people “would flee
to the mountains until the government made peace [...]
and attack all negari in Seram if the government intended to
establish settlements in Nuniali and Kaibobo” (bid, 2021:
534-535).

The threat revealed that the interior of Seram had been one
of the refuge zones inhabited by the Alifuru, who actively
and deliberately, chose to avoid and distance themselves from
the state to maintain their autonomy. The South Moluccan
Republic (RMS) guerrillas employed the same tactics when
they retreated to the interior of Buru and Seram throughout

the 1950s.

Closing

From the explanation above, it is evident that state formation
in Maluku was influenced by dynamic interactions within the
context of the spice trade. The political and economic changes
accompanying the arrival and consolidation of Islam and
Europe from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries ensured
the central position of Maluku — with its clove-producing
islands — in the north and the dominance of Ternate and Tidore
at its core. By the late sixteenth century, the Ternate and Tidore
palace decided to emulate other Muslim kingdoms in the
archipelago in terms of dress style, language, and governance
structure reforms.

As the sixteenth century progressed, various influences
culminated in a transformation of the social and political
systems in Ternate and Tidore, shifting from kinship-based
societies where decisions were made by consensus of the elders
to Islamic sultanates with hierarchical power centered on a
single individual. In the latter half of the sixteenth century, the
sultans of Ternate and Tidore had centralized enough power
to compete with each other over control of vast territories,
including most of northern Maluku, parts of central Maluku,
Sulawesi, and Raja Ampat islands. The sultans governed
these regions through colonization and the presence of their
representatives. Tributes and mandatory labor were collected
and sent to Ternate-Tidore. Women from various regions were
also taken as wives by the sultans.

Since the arrival of Portuguese and Spanish, and ultimately
the Dutch — who succeeded in defeating both — only Tidore
and Ternate remained as entities capable of dealing with the

66 | Closing

growing European power in Maluku. Ternate and Tidore saw
Europe as key allies in their rivalry. Whenever opportunities
arose, Ternate and Tidore took advantage to expand control
over surrounding territories. They absorbed several regions that
were left without rulers due to the decline or destruction of
Jailolo, Bacan, and Banggai.

This state formation process intensified primarily due to
European assistance and encouragement, as Europeans benefited
from the centralization of power. For hundreds of years since
the first Europeans arrived in Maluku in the 1500s, their project
proceeded through the conquest and incorporation of vast
areas of the Alifuru World into state space, often violently (in
some cases voluntarily), and was maintained through violence.

Alifuru holds no specific meaning in ethnology. Its definition is
almost entirely economic and political, typically used to refer the
tribes as “service providers, gatherers, and political subordinates,
supplying sago, spices, and other necessities to coastal rulers
and trading centers.” However, Sutherland (2021: 70) reminds
us that this understanding “underestimates the autonomy
of the Alifuru community, which is nearly impossible to
control. Alifuru subjugation is inherently uncertain.” ‘The final
conclusion: Alifuru represents those who resisted domination
and taming throughout the state formation projects in Maluku
from the 15th to 19th centuries. We call this anarchy.

Chapter 3.
The Mardika Strategy:

Preventing State Formation

Siwa-Lima as Primitive War

Reports from the Europeans, whether explorers, colonial officials,
missionaries, or anthropologists, were filled with prejudices
inherited from the ancient Greek and Roman paradigm regarding
the division between the center of civilization and the periphery
inhabited by barbarians. This paradigm did not change much until
early modern writers like Thomas Hobbes, in his work Leviathan
(1651). According to him, the natural state of humans is acondition
of anarchic war of all against all. Thus, Antonio Galvao wrote the
ancient tale of Bacan in the mid-16th century:

“Once long ago there were no kings and the people
lived in kinship groups (Port., parentela) governed
by elders. Since “no one was better than the other,”
dissension and wars arose, alliances made and broken,
and people killed or captured and ransomed.””

According to Hobbes, peace and security can only be created
by a strong government with undivided power. A similar
impression was made in the 1600s by Spanish missionary Juan
de la Camara when he commented on Timorese society: “they
never united with one another, but always fought one

55. From Jacobs, Hubert (ed. & trans.), A Treatise on the Moluccas (1971),
81-83. Entirely quoted from Andaya, The World of Maluku (1993), 53.

68 Siwa-Lima as Primitive War

another.”*® Dutch sailor Dirk Hendrik Kolff, upon arriving on
Lakor Island in 1825, also linked societal fragmentation with
the absence of a government:

“During my short stay I was constantly employed
in deciding all sorts of petty differences, for the
people live in a state of great disunion, and without
the interference of the Government, or of European
traders, they remain obstinately irreconcilable on
the slightest quarrel. Neither do they acknowledge
the authority of their chiefs unless they have been
installed by the Dutch Government.”

‘The absence of kings and states is at best seen as low culture, or
at worst, depicted as uncivilized. Being stateless was considered
equivalent to animals, for a society without a state was perceived as
no society at all. The existence of state was seen as a pillar of order
and peace; anarchy meant chaos and war. Although European
reports were often exaggerated, there was some truth in this matter.

Both European historical records and Maluku oral history recount the
existence of various war alliances and cross-village (negeri) coalitions,
symbolized through Siwa-Lima, meaning the alliance of five and the
alliance of nine. Siwa-Lima cannot be understood as a segregated
‘two-block political system, but as a conceptually complementary
unity. There is no Siwa without Lima and vice versa. It is an inverted
and symmetrical system.”® Just like two sides of a coin.

56. Manuel Teixeira, Macau e a sua diocese IV: A diocese de Malaca (Macau,
1957), 451. Quoted from Hagerdal, “Slaves and Slave Trade in the Timor Area:

Between Indigenous Structures and External Impact.” Journal of Social History,
Volume 54, Issue 1 (Fall 2020” (2020), 19.

a7: Kolff, Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga (1840), 111.

58. For better explanation of Siwa-Lima, see Valeri, “Reciprocal Centers:
The Siwa-Lima System in the Central Moluccas” in The Attraction of Opposites
(1989), 117-141.

Siwa-Lima as Primitive War 69

Traditionally, Siwa-Lima existed within an endogamous society,
and typically there was no peaceful or positive exchange between
the two. Instead, they were described as “mortal enemies” who
only interacted through war. This war between the alliance
of nine and the alliance of five, in the traditional context of
Maluku, also implied headhunting from each other (Valeri,
1989: 123 & 137). Both also increased hatred and facilitated
reconciliation between communities (Sutherland, 2021: 135).

Interestingly, the dualism of the Siwa-Lima organization does
not exist in North Maluku. It can only be found in stateless
societies in the central and southern parts of Maluku, or as
Valeri (1989: 137) described, “developed at the periphery of
centralized system.” For instance, Uli Siwa and Uli Lima in
Banda, Patasiwa and Patalima in Seram, Lorsiw and Lorlim
in Kei, and Urlima and Ursiwa in Aru and Tanimbar. Why is
that so? How can we explain a group of people who agree to
embrace an identity that marks hostility and will only separate,
discriminate, and divide them into war?

In the Archeology of Violence essay, Pierre Clastres rejects
Hobbes’s understanding that primitive society is a war of
all against all. Clastres explains that anarchic-primitive
society cannot wage war to conquer because if that were the
case, there would be winners and those who are conquered.
According to him (2010265), a war of all against all would
lead to the establishment of domination and power that can
be forcibly exerted by the winners over the conquered. A new
social configuration would then emerge, creating command-
obedience relationships and the political division of society
into Masters and Slaves: “It would be the death of primitive
society,” because the master-slave division does not exist in
primitive society. In his 1838 report, British navigator George

70 | Siwa-Lima as Primitive War

Windsor Earl also commented on the extent to which “chaos”
in Leti occurred due to villages remaining autonomous from
one another:

“Kisser is the only island of this group in which
there is a raja, or head chief. In all the others each
village is independent, and consequently jealousies
and quarrels arise, often ending in wars, which,
however, are rarely attended with much bloodshed.
Muskets are used in warfare throughout the group;
but the people are so unskillful in the use of them,
and the ammunition they use is so bad, that a
battle frequently ends without loss of life, or at
most with the death of only one or two. These
quarrels, however, have the effect of rendering the
inhabitants of the islands in which they take place
turbulent and disagreeable. At Letti, in particular,
we found this to be the case. Had the chiefs of
the different villages any supreme authority to
which to appeal for a decision of their disputes,

I am convinced that the case would be materially
altered.”

“Tt often ends in war, but rarely accompanied by much bloodshed.”
This sentence needs to be emphasized as it accurately describes
traditional warfare in Maluku. Although more deadly wars
could occur among the coastal inhabitants of Ambon, some

reports cited by Sutherland (2021: 129) indicate that these
were rare exceptions. The situation was similar in other regions.

59. G.W Earl, “An Account of a Visit to Kisser” (1841), 112. ‘Letti’? here
refers to Leti.

Siwa-Lima as Primitive War 71

A shipwrecked sailor in Timor wrote that local “wars have more
in common with children’s games than real fighting.”

When discussing how the Alifuru waged war in the interior
of Seram up until the 1700s, Knaap (2003 168) stated that
“The purpose of these actions does not appear to have been
conquest. Instead, the aim was either to take prisoners or the
heads of people slain, irrespective of whether they were males,
females, or children.” At every significant moment in the life
cycle of the Alifuru community, such as the construction of
bailehu {council hall] and the initiation of boys and girls into
adulthood, the sacrifice of another person’s life was required.
Headhunting was carried out by only a dozen people with
simple weapons, targeting distant negeri [villages] rather than
neighboring ones. Therefore, it is not surprising that Seram
Island was always plagued by small-scale wars, and each
village was always on alert, but there was never any conquest
or massacre. However, larger wars could occur due to disputes
among leaders or conflicts. Should they received bad omens
upon arriving at the enemy’s settlement, some warriors would
advance first — if they succeeded, the others would follow, if
they failed, they would all retreat.

Historians generally agree that wars in Maluku became
bloodier due to colonialism. According to Andaya (1993),
the European model of warfare required more personnel and
weaponry compared to traditional warfare, leading to more
casualties and escalating blood feuds. ‘The intervention of the
Portuguese and Dutch sparked an intensive period of warfare
that lasted about a hundred years in Seram and Ambon. Knaap
(2003: 190) notes that this was due to the introduction of
European firearms and the large-scale killings, occupations,
and destruction they instigated, which were greater than

72 Siwa-Lima as Primitive War

before. This was further exacerbated by religious differences.
Additionally, Schapper’s (2019) study shows that although
stone dwellings were a traditional architectural style, stone
forts began to be constructed in the southwestern and southern
Maluku islands in the first half of 17th century due to the
climate of fear stemming from the Dutch massacre in Banda in
1621. This also indicates an awareness of the need to enhance
village security as result of European colonialism.

Besides rejecting Hobbes’ understanding, Clastres also rejected
the implied exchange concept by Lévi-Strauss: that there is
war, therefore no exchange; there is exchange, therefore no war.
For Clastres, exchange and alliance are merely consequences of
war, because if there is an enemy, there must be allies (bound
by marriage). Primitive societies cannot practice universal
kinship in the exchange of women (or marriage, to prevent
incest) as modern societies do, due to spatial constraints where
friendship does not adapt well to distance. Exchange is easily
maintained with nearby neighbors who can be invited to a
feast, from someone who can accept the invitation, and who
can be visited. With distant groups, such relationships cannot
be established. Thus, primitive societies cannot be friends with
everyone or enemies with everyone.

“In the case of friendship of all with all, the
community would lose its autonomous totality
through the dissolution of its difference. In the
case of war of all against all, it would lose its
homogeneous unity through the irruption of social
division primitive society is a single totality. It
cannot consent to universal peace which alienates
its freedom; it cannot abandon itself to general

Siwa-Lima as Primitive War 73

war which abolishes its equality. It is not possible,
among the Savages, to be either friend of all or
enemy of all.” (Clastres, 2010: 265).

Therefore, Clastres (2010: 271-274) argues that war holds
a different meaning for primitive societies. “The constant
problem of the primitive community is not: whom will we
trade with? but: how can we maintain our independence?”
For primitive societies, war serves to preserve the political
independence of each community. As long as there is war,
there is autonomy: that is why war cannot and must not cease,
which is why war has a permanent nature: if an enemy does not
exist, an enemy must be created. This opinion may explain why
societies without states are historically more prone to conflict.
Kolff, in his 1825 report on the island of Leti, explained that
disputes among community leaders occurred so easily because
they considered themselves equals:

“When distributing the presents, sent by the
Government, at the general meeting of the chiefs,
I was requested to apportion the shares for each
village, the chiefs themselves candidly confessing
that since they all considered themselves as equal
in point of rank, were this duty left to themselves,
it would certainly give rise to a renewal of the

discord that had so long prevailed among them.”

The report quoted above shows that war and the absence
of state are treated as synonyms. The weakness of authority,
autonomous villages, and equality among residents — namely
the absence of a state in Maluku — are seen by Europeans as

60. Kolff, Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga (1840), 68.

74 | Indigenous Confederations

conditions causing war. For Hobbes, state exists to oppose war;
for Clastres, it is the opposite, war exists to oppose the state.
“,..the machine of dispersion functions against the machine of
unification (Clastres, 2010: 277). Siwa-Lima acts as a Clastrian
machine to prevent the state.

Indigenous Confederations

When European reports state that unity can only be achieved
through the state, it implies that anarchic societies are incapable
of managing collective affairs on a scale beyond their residential
communities (communes). If Siwa-Lima is a mechanism for
dissolution that prevents its society from uniting in anti-state
logic, I have found that societies in Maluku, at different periods
of time, have created non-state institutions. Unlike Jailolo,
Bacan, Ternate, or Tidore, which evolved into institutions
where the centralization of power ended with decision-making
monopolized by a few or even a single person, in some places in
Maluku institutions were established for centralized collective
decision-making while maintaining local political norms. These
institutions resemble a federation, as proposed by theorists of
modern anarchism in the history of political thought.”!

Since the emergence of modern anarchism in the mid-19th
century, anarchists have consistently proposed federalism
of direct democratic communes as a replacement for the
state. This institution is where people make decisions about
important matters concerning their lives, instead of leaving
these matters to be determined by a few individuals. Although
this development was not new at its time, it was first articulated
by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, often referred to as the “Founding
Father of Anarchism” from France. In Du Principe Fédératif

61 Federation in this text is different from “federal state.”

Indigenous Confederations | 75

(1863), Proudhon stated that “the federal system is the
opposite of hierarchy or administrative and governmental
centralization.” According to him,

“What is essential to and characteristic of the
federal contract, and what I most wish the reader
to notice, is that in this system the contracting
parties, whether heads of family, towns, cantons,
provinces, or states, not only undertake bilateral
and commutative obligations, but in making the
pact reserve for themselves more rights, more
liberty, more authority, more property than they
abandon.”

Proudhon’s federalism was also championed by Mikhail
Bakunin, who translated Das Kapital into Russian. While
Bakunin drew inspiration from Marx’s economic analysis, he
did not do so with his politics. He rejected the dictatorship
of the proletariat and thus merged Marx’s communism with
Proudhon’s political federalism. In his work Federalism,
Socialism, Anti-Theologism (1867), Bakunin wrote:

‘... we today conclude in favor of the absolute
need of destroying the states. Or, if it is so decided,
their radical and complete transformation so that,
ceasing to be powers centralized and organized
from the top down, by violence or by authority
of some principle, they may recognize — with
absolute liberty for all the parties to unite or not to
unite, and with liberty for each of these always to
leave a union even when freely entered into — from
the bottom up, according to the real needs and the

76 | Indigenous Confederations

natural tendencies of the parties, through the free
federation of individuals, associations, communes,
districts, provinces, and nations within humanity.”

In the next generation, Peter Kropotkin credited federalism
to Bakunin. He even wrote about it optimistically, calling it
“our federated commune of the future.” For him, the state and
federation were two opposites. “Ihe Commune,” Kropotkin
wrote, in a situation of dual power, “will know that it must
break the State and replace it by the Federation.”®

Broadly speaking, anarchists agree on the implementation of
direct democracy within communes with populations reasonable
enough to carry out face-to-face meetings. “Form groups of a
modest size, individually sovereign, and unite them by a federal
pact,” wrote Proudhon, which requires decentralization. But
no commune can stand alone. Peter Kropotkin believed that
successful commune experiments must be federated. From
small units, they then organize into wider and wider areas. In
Bakunin’s explanation: “...having no other principle but the
free federation of individuals into communes, of communes
into provinces, of the provinces into nations, and, finally, of the
nations into the United States of Europe first, and of the entire
world eventually.”

The anarchists proposal for autonomous communes,
implementing direct democracy, decentralized but connected
in federalism, though in a much looser form, has been
practiced by ancestors in Maluku. Roy Ellen (2003: 8) argues
that trade in the Banda Zone was not conducted by a large,
centralized government controlling river mouths as in the
Straits of Malacca. In central Maluku, Ellen notes that “loose

62. Peter Kropotkin, Words of'a Rebel, 1882

Indigenous Confederations | 77

federations” persisted on small islands like Banda because there
were no extensive forest areas whose access could be controlled
via river estuary or coastlines.

The Gamrange people, originating from three regions (Weda,
Maba, and Patani) along the coast of Weda Bay in Southeast
Halmahera, have rejected the dual hegemony of Ternate-Tidore
by choosing to revere the past glory of the defunct Jailolo. This
strategy of aligning themselves with a now-nonexistent power
allowed the Gamrange people to create de facto autonomy
from Ternate-Tidore while establishing their own political
institutions, which “had the right to govern their respective
territories, like autonomous regions, but with the obligation to

help each other” (Topatimasang, 2016: 98).

“[...] they even ‘blamed’ Tidore who was
practically not helping Jailolo and Dano Hassan
(from Maba) when they rebelled against Ternate.
The fall of the Jailolo sultanate and the defeat of
Dano Hassan’s rebellion ultimately turned this
area into terra incognita (no man’s land) from that
point on. Finally, the people of Weda, Patani,
and Maba formed an autonomous socio-political
confederation called Fogoguru” (Topatimasang,
2016: 88).

‘The practice of federalism has been commonly found in Seram
and Ambon Lease. Sutherland (2021: 135) states, “A sketch
of Ambon’s sociopolitical organisation would encompass
hamlets, villages, village federations, and federations of village
federations...” Alliances and connections between villages

often overlapped geographically and through kinship bonds.

78 | Indigenous Confederations

For example, pela-gandong was often performed as an oath to
mutually aid between regions.

As in Halmahera, two confederations were organized in Seram.
In southeast Seram and Seram Laut, there was Seri-Tahun,
which in oral history is described as a “...confederation formed
by the rajas of the five domains of Kianlaut, Kiandarat, Kwaos,
Urung, and Keffing to organize against the Dutch...” (Roy
Ellen, 2003: 36).

In central Seram, there was also Saniri Waele Telu (Malay:
Saniri Tiga Air) which united the Alifuru from three rivers:
Tala, Eti, and Sapalewa. Although the purpose of Saniri was
not achieved, there are those who believe that Saniri was aimed
at combating the influence of Ternate, then the Dutch. Others
argue that Saniri was “a confederacy aimed at bringing some
sort of peace to an area suffering from endemic petty warfare.
What started as an institution meant to solve internal problems,
however, gradually developed into something which also aimed
at resisting intrusions into its cultural legacy” (Knaap, 1993:

270).

Several reports from the Dutch colonial officials documented
Saniri Waele Telu from the 17th to early 20th centuries. These
reports indicate that Saniri meetings could be attended by over
500 participants from various villages in the three river systems
in Seram — though they often did not always proceed smoothly
—all initiated by a secret society known as Kakean. The main
leader was called Inama (Malay: Head of Saniri), derived from
the words ina meaning “mother” and ama meaning “father.”
However, like other Alifuru leaders in the interior of Seram,
his authority was too weak outside of Saniri meetings (Knaap,

1993).

The Miracle of Trading | 79

Siwa-Lima itself is essentially a village federation
administered by councils within which one man would be
recognised as primus inter pares” (Sutherland, 2021: 134). This
means Siwa refers to a federation of nine, and conversely, a
federation of five. This broader territorial arrangement occurs
not only in the political sphere but also in the economic sphere.
According to Valeri (1989: 121): “the Siwa-Lima system
presupposes a metatribal, territorially discrete confederation.
The confederations, in turn, presuppose a system of trade....”

The Miracle of Trading

For Europeans, the establishment of a state was considered
essential for the welfare and interests of the colonized societies,
supposedly to advance them toward a civilization whose
standards were, of course, determined by Europeans. In 1888,
Anna Forbes, the wife of a renowned Scottish naturalist, stayed
for several days in the village of Waai, Ambon. At that time,
she regretted that the potential resources of Waai village were
not being utilized properly by the residents who were led by a
weak Rajah, and therefore, supported the idea that the people

of Waai be governed with an iron hand:

“As I have said, civilising influences have not really raised their
moral status; they have become more independent — not,
however, for their own good. I fancy it is beneficial for such a
people to be under an autocratic ruler. The Rajah tells us his
authority is now a mere name. He was once called to attend
a conference at Amboina. The men who rowed him “struck”
half-way, and turned the boat homewards. They were arrested,
and sentenced to eight days’ imprisonment, after which they
came back with such a tale of the good time they had had —
feeding well without any labour or cost, and playing cards all

80 | The Miracle of Trading

day with pleasant companions — that more harm than good
was effected by the punishment.”

European views should be suspected as being part of an agenda
to turn indigenous societies into subjects of discipline. In such
cases, colonialism often found justification in the paradigm in
which Europeans felt they bore the responsibility to advance
indigenous societies, which were perceived as being at a lower
level of civilization or entirely uncivilized. Underneath this, the
primary goal was to enhance the ability to identify, monitor,
measure and calculate, govern, mobilize human resources,
and exploit the resources of indigenous societies. This agenda
was sometimes framed as eradicating illiteracy, pacifying
conflict areas, spreading Christianity, or primarily economic
development, implying that indigenous peoples were too lazy
or ignorant to trade.

In his book Trade Without Rulers, Northrup (1978: 4-5)
critiques the prejudice that views small-scale non-state societies
as insufficiently capable of engaging in cultural and economic
systems far larger than their political units. He argues that large-
scale trade does not require large-scale political institutions.
Although Northrup’s study was conducted in Africa, his views
also apply to Maluku. Interestingly, these federative institutions
coexisted with traditional warfare and trade. Let’s take the
examples of Banda and Aru.

63. Anna Forbes, J/nsulinde (1887), 87.

The Miracle of Trading | 81

Figure 16. Banda warriors enjoyed their meal before the battle.

At the end of the 16th century, the Spanish chronicler
Argensola described that “there were seven towns on the island
[Banda], where they were hostile to each other.”® The oldest
report about Siwa-Lima that we can trace also comes from
Banda. Made by a Dutch East India Company official before
1621, the following report shows that Siwa-Lima ensured each
participant was relatively equal without being united by a state:

“Whenever they gather to discuss important
matters, the Orang Kayas take their place [on the
low platform under the tree], each according to
his descent and age, showing great deference to
each other, while the common people ... sit on
the ground, the uli siwa [federation] on the west
and south, the uli lima [federation] on the east
and north... [NJo serious political matters or war

64. Argensola, Conquista de las Islas Molucas (1891), 241.

82 | The Miracle of Trading

can be decided alone.... [The representatives of
the different villages] always want to be cock of
the walk, but have to respect the others [or they
must pay a large fine]. In this way they keep each
other in check, so that they can all be equal, which

di : 65
causes great issension.

At the same time, the trade arrangements in Banda were also
different from Ternate and Tidore:

“The Banda Islands were certainly an important —
indeed the most important — central place, over
many hundreds of years, articulating trade over
a vast area; but Banda was was not a state, and
neither were its composite polities. Moreover, it
never claimed territory or exercised conventional

political control over people and resources beyond
Banda itself.” (Ellen, 2003: 8).

Alfred Russel Wallace also had quite a positive impression while
in the interior of Aru to collect his specimens. He recounted that
a war was occurring between two nearby Alifuru villages. “They
told me it was acommon thing,” he wrote, “Individual quarrels
are taken up by villages and tribes, and the nonpayment of the
stipulated price for a wife is one of the most frequent causes of
bitterness and bloodshed.” At the same time in March 1857,
while he was in Dobbo, Aru, Wallace recounted that he “walk
daily unarmed in the jungle, where I meet them continually; I
sleep in a palm-leaf hut, which any one may enter, with as little
65. PA. Leupe, “Beschrijvinge van de Eijlande Banda,” BKI 3, no. 1 (1855): 75-6.

Quoted and translated from Sutherland, Seaways and Gatekeeper (2021),133.
66. Wallace, The Malay Archipelago (1877), 471.

The Miracle of Trading | 83

fear and as little danger of thieves or murder as if I were under
the protection of the Metropolitan police.”®” He wrote:

“This motley, ignorant, bloodthirsty, thievish
population live here without the shadow of a
government, with no police, no courts, and no
lawyers; yet they do not cut each other’s throats,
do not plunder each other day and night, do not
fall into the anarchy such a state of things might
be supposed to lead to. It is very extraordinary!”

Regarding Aru, Kolff expressed a similar impression:

“It is certainly worthy of remark, that these
simple Arafuras, without hope of reward, or fear
of punishment after death, live in such peace and
brotherly love with one another; and that they
recognize the right of property, in the fullest sense
of the word, without there being any authority
among them than the decisions of their elders,
according to the customs of their forefathers,

which are held in the highest regard.”

When Kolf and Wallace wrote those impressions, the modern
anarchist political movement had not yet formed. Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon claimed himself as an anarchist a few years before Wallace
went to Maluku. So, although Wallace used the term anarchist
in a negative connotation, the situation he described aligns with
anarchist political ideals. His reflection on his amazement was:

67. Wallace, The Malay Archipelago (1877), 440.
68. Wallace, The Malay Archipelago (1877), 439.
69. Kolff, Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga (1840), 161. ‘Arafuras’ here

refers to Alifuru

84 | The Miracle of Trading

“It puts strange thoughts into one’s head about
the mountain-load of government under which
people exist in Europe, and suggests the idea that
we may be overgoverned. Think of the hundred
Acts of Parliament annually enacted to prevent us,
the people of England, from cutting each other's
throats, or from doing to our neighbour as we
would not be done by. Think of the thousands of
lawyers and barristers whose whole lives are spent
in telling us what the hundred Acts of Parliament
mean, and one would be led to infer that if Dobbo
has too little law England has too much.””°

Wallace’s findings challenged the political philosophy of
Hobbes’ Leviathan, which was popular at the time, asserting
that without government, a chaotic natural state would
ensue. The existence of authority was justified because it was
necessary to prevent disputes and wars. So, how to bridge the
contradiction seen in Wallace’s observation that frequent wars
occurred among the Alifuru (Jarjui people) in Aru, but, at the
same time, he could still feel safe in the interior? Wallace has
the answer.

70. Wallace, The Malay Archipelago, 439.

The Miracle of Trading | 85

Figure 17. Aru people, circa 1890-1915.

From Wallace’s explanation, we know that Dobbo at that
time was a settlement of traders on the coast, partly Bugis and
Chinese, but also Javanese, Seramese, Babar, and immigrants
from other islands. Meanwhile, the interior of Aru was
inhabited by indigenous people, who came to Dobbo to trade
forest products. Wars among the Alifuru seemed localized, as
they did not cause widespread disruption in Aru. Issues between
village A and village B did not spread further. Moreover, as I
explained earlier, wars among traditional societies were usually
less deadly and not aimed at conquest. This is why coastal
and inland relations could be well maintained. When news of
Wallace’s presence spread, many Alifuru people from various
parts of Aru came to trade goods. He also roamed the interior
safely. According to Wallace, since there was no government in
Aru, it was not the state that kept its people from falling into
“chaos”:

86 | The Miracle of ‘Trading

“Here we may behold in its simplest form the
genius of Commerce at the work of Civilization.
Trade is the magic that keeps all at peace, and
unites these discordant elements into a well-
behaved community. All are traders, and all know
that peace and order are essential to successful
trade, and thus a public opinion is created which

puts down all lawlessness.””!

Interestingly, this same formulation by Wallace proved to be
true hundreds of years later. In 1999, sectarian riots broke out,
dividing the Muslim and Christian populations in Ambon.
The government structure collapsed, trading activities ceased,
and markets were set ablaze; even the security forces were
split into two factions. To meet the increasingly difficult basic
living needs, female traders (papalele) in Ambon, regardless
of religion, took the initiative to create impromptu markets,
later known as “pasar bakubae” (reconciliation market). In
this case, it was not religious leaders, politicians, or soldiers
who led the effort, but small traders in Ambon who bridged
the gap between Muslim and Christian groups due to their
shared needs.” This phenomenon occurred in the Mardika
area, Ambon, adding another way for the Maluku people to
organize grassroots reconciliation when the state “collapsed”
for several years (1999-2003). The past and present of Maluku
are intertwined through beautiful coincidences.

Fle Wallace, The Malay Archipelago, 439-440.

72. See Talakua, “Pasar; Bakudapa Bangun Rekonsiliasi” (2017). Also Aziz
Tunny, “Jejak-jejak Perjumpaan,” in Carita Orang Basudara (2014). Such events did
not occur in Sampit, Poso, or other conflict points in Indonesia during the early
Reformation; throughout Indonesia, military intervention seemed more necessary
to forcibly suppress civil conflicts.

The Miracle of Trading | 87

Aruand Banda Islands were both involved in strategic trade, and
this could take place without needing a king or a state. Banda
was the economic center of this region, trading independently
before the Dutch conquered it. Unlike Ternate-Tidore or the
agrarian states of Java, the system in Banda “...provided a
relatively neutral space for both local and incoming traders to
operate, free from the intrusions of other states, and a set of
supporting institutional practices.” (Ellen, 2003: 279). After
the Banda Massacre in 1621, Aru became a major trading point
without a ruler and remained relatively undisturbed until the
late 19th century. The Protestant Church mission only entered
the Aru Islands in 1870, and the Dutch trade surveillance post
was established in 1874, decades after Wallace’s visit.

The case was different for Leti Island, which also lacked a state but
was less economically fortunate. Although Aru was sometimes
targeted by pirates or slave hunters, Leti and the Timor and
southwest Maluku waters seemed less stable compared to Aru,
especially compared to Banda in the 16th century. According
to Hagerdal (2020), the presence of the Portuguese and Dutch
in Timor created a broad political network but failed to create
safe conditions. On the contrary, Portuguese-Dutch rivalry
often became a reason for attacks among their respective allies.
Religion could be a marker, as these pirates came from East
Seram and sometimes Makassar, which were Muslim, while
Leti, Moa, Timor, and Wetar adhered to ancestral (Alifuru) or
sometimes Christian religions, making them easier targets for
slavery.

Similar instability also occurred in Seram, where the tentacles
of Ternate-Tidore and the Dutch monopoly on spice trade tried
to grip the region. Traders from the west, especially Makassar,
tried to penetrate the Dutch blockade for cheaper alternative

88 | How Rich are the Orang Kaya?

access to spices from Seram. Dutch efforts to prevent this made
peaceful and free trade impossible.

Historically, the presence of the state was more of a disturbance
to local economic-political order than a driving force for
development. Despite being in a Eurocentric paradigm, when
reviewing the spice monopoly in Banda by the Dutch government,
Wallace concluded: “The true ‘political economy’ of a higher race,
when ruling a lower race, has never succeeded. The application
of our ‘political economy’ to such cases has always resulted in the
extinction or destruction of the lower race.”’? Wallace was also
right that the main profits from the spice monopoly did not flow
to the nation, but to a handful of people.

How Rich are the Orang Kaya?

The concentration of power aligns with the accumulation
of wealth. These two things are among the prerequisites for
the formation of states in Maluku, as seen in the cases of
Ternate and Tidore, where the profits from the spice trade
primarily flowed to the sultans. But this did not happen with
the Alifuru. Not because they were incapable. The spice trade
in Banda, and the trade of sea cucumbers and pearls in Aru
enabled chiefs to accumulate wealth. That is why the title of
chiefs and respected elders in central and southern Maluku is
historically referred to as ‘orang kaya (rich people). However,
there were several cultural practices in Maluku that prevented
serious accumulation of wealth by preventing the emergence of
entrepreneurs who could become rulers.

Wallace stated that the people of Aru “[s]ometimes they hunt
or fish a little, or work at their houses or canoes, but they seem

733 Wallace, The Malay Archipelago (1877), 439.

How Rich are the Orang Kaya? | 89

to enjoy pure idleness, and work as little as they can.””* The
inhabitants of Banda before 1621 were said to “live off the
produce of their land; and although there was constant war,
most remained idle.”” Similar depictions have been repeated
almost everywhere of Maluku for hundreds of years. The main
response to this is usually that these depictions were merely
used as a justification for colonialism. While there is some
truth to this, the work hours and leisure time in societies as
recorded by Europeans were not actually excessive.

Pierre Clastres, by analyzing the mode of domestic production
by Marshall Sahlins, cites ethnographic evidence that primitive
economies were indeed less productive because work was
consumer production to ensure the satisfaction of needs and
not as exchange production to gain profit by commercializing
surplus goods. According to him, primitive societies are societies
that refuse economy (Clastres, 2010: 198). This view might
further explain the myth of the lazy native; laziness is a rejection
of accumulation: “...primitive man is not an entrepreneur,
it is because profit does not interest him; that if he does not
“optimize” his activity, as the pedants like to say, it is not
because he does not know how to, but because he does not feel

like it!” (Ibid, 193).

Clastres (2010: 199) also concluded that “[p]rimitive society
allows poverty for everyone, but not accumulation by some.”
Accumulation by a few means changing social relations,
namely a division that forms a dominant minority (chiefs and
clients) that would rule and dominate the majority. That is
why Clastres said that the conditions to become a chief are the
ability to speak well and generosity.

7A. Wallace, The Malay Archipelago (1877), 450.
Te Argensola, Conquista de las Islas Molucas (1891), 243.

90 | How Rich are the Orang Kaya?

Within this understanding, the most diligent individuals find
their place in society. However, everything is arranged in sucha
way that they cannot be used as a means to create permanently
unequal wealth, as forms of self-enrichment would end in
competitions to see who can give the most. One of the ways to
manifest this is through the redistribution wealth of the chiefs
in various expensive celebrations and feasts. Sachse (1907: 160)
reported that “The Alifuru people are lovers of celebrations and
they happily take advantage of every opportunity to celebrate.
For example, if a chief is appointed, the celebration lasts at
least a full week.” This tradition reflects one characteristic of
the “orang besar” (big men) who may be influential but not
powerful, as explained in Chapter 1.

“In exchange for his generosity, what does the big-
man get? Not the fulfillment of his desire for power,
but the fragile satisfaction of his honor; not the
ability to command, but the innocent enjoyment
of a glory he exhausts himself to maintain. He
works, literally, for glory: society gives it to him
willingly, busy as it is savoring the fruit of its chief
‘s labor.” (Clastres, 2010: 202).

Aside from redistributing wealth, the other option is to
destroy wealth. The Alifuru people in Seram have countered
accumulation in a more extreme way. Sachse (1907: 149)
noted, “throughout Seram, a grave is given no marker, but as
a sign of mourning, plates, gongs, and other items are broken
and thrown upon it.” In Aru in 1825, it was also reported:

How Rich are the Orang Kaya? | 91

“When a man dies all his relations assemble and
destroy all the goods he may have collected during
his life, even the gongs are broken to pieces and
thrown away. In their villages I met with several
heaps of porcelain plates and basins, the property
of deceased. individuals, the survivors entertaining
an idea that they have no right to make use of

them,””¢

This custom is no longer practiced. When Wallace visited Aru
30 years later, he described a different burial practice in Aru.
He acknowledged: “...they have evidently been considerably
influenced by their long association with Mahometan
traders.”’” The same case applies to Tobelo in Halmahera, where
the arrival of Christianity led to the prohibition of traditional
death ceremonies and their replacement with Christian burials.
According to Platenkamp: “...no other ideological element of
Tobelo has ever been altered so drastically by the introduction
of Christian teachings as the concept of death.” In Aru Islands
themselves, more than half of the population now embraces
Christianity.

Topatimasang (2016: 28) argues that the implementation
of [religious] values is also related to economic and political
interests, namely as a cultural legitimacy basis for the expansion
of capital and government power. According to him, “the
indigenous people of Maluku can no longer use their traditional
teachings and beliefs, which have very different perspectives, as
reasons to reject, argue against, or protest the influx of capitalists

76. Kolff, Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga (1840), 166-167.
TT: Wallace, The Malay Archipelago (1877), 481.
78. Platenkamp. Zobelo: Ideas and Values of a North Moluccan Society (1988).

Quoted from Roem Topatimasang, Orang-orang Kalah (2016).

92 | How Rich are the Orang Kaya?

supported by official rulers endorsed by official religious
institutions.” Of course, sometimes religion can preserve some
local cultural practices; both can coexist. But religion also
eradicates beliefs that help prevent wealth accumulation. The
Abrahamic religions, which inherently have a liberating side,
when promoted by Sultanates and colonial states, historically
perpetuated wealth accumulation, the foundation of hierarchy,
which became the initial stage of state formation. This is an
interesting topic to explore further.

Closing

The formation of the state is prevented by various mechanisms
in Alifuru culture that shut down the possibility of power
centralization and prevent wealth accumulation, which are
some of the factors for state formation. One of the mechanisms
in Maluku’s social life that seems beneficial to prevent the
formation of the state is Siwa-Lima. They do not reject unity,
because Siwa-Lima itself is unity within the concept of dualism;
instead, Siwa-Lima rejects the stage of power centralization, as
in the case of Ternate-Tidore. Siwa-Lima is a symbolic pact that
binds its participants collectively, both in the alliance of nine or
the alliance of five, to remain in a stateless condition, ensuring
autonomy and equality in the balance of adversaries. War in
the concept of Siwa-Lima is not for conquest, and without
conquest, a state will not be formed. Without Siwa, there will
be no Lima and vice versa.

Instead of power centralization with the establishment of Islamic
monarchies, many stateless societies in Maluku established
various federations, and there were at least three confederations
(Fogoguru in Halmahera, Seri-Tahun, and Saniri Tiga Air in
Seram) that align with modern anarchist theory, albeit very
loosely applied. From some gathered information, Saniri
itself was a council that managed reconciliation in disputes,
indicating that wars and headhunting were attempted to be
controlled or mitigated, but not eradicated. Such efforts also

failed.

Not all areas had federations, as some islands had villages
that were entirely independent of each other. Therefore, the
existence of these institutions showed the capacity for self-

Qg4 | Closing

organization within broader areas, united by common interests
and needs, especially security and self-defense. At the same
time, this allowed for the regulation of their own economy.

Ergo, with or without a state, wars could happen. With or
without a state, trade could happen. With or without a state,
peace could also happen. Now, the arrangement for with or
without a state is an active choice. Alifuru, therefore, aligns
with David Graeber’s explanation: “Anarchistic societies are
no more unaware of human capacities for greed or vainglory
than modern Americans are unaware of human capacities for
envy, gluttony, or sloth; they would just find them equally
unappealing as the basis for their civilization. In fact, they
see these phenomena as moral dangers so dire they end up
organizing much of their social life around containing them.”

(Graeber, 2004: 24). We call this anarchy.

Conclusion.
Alifuru: Conquest & Liberation

The characteristics commonly attributed to the Alifuru as a
stateless society are usually the same: Living in the interior or
highlands, not wearing clothes, barbaric, adhering to ancestral
beliefs, etc.” Unlike the state formation projects of Ternate-
Tidore, colonial, and the new Indonesian nation-state, which
represent the opposite of Alifuru: living on the coast and lowlands,
dressed, civilized, and embracing Islam (and later Christianity).
Both exist in a mutually dependent relationship, as, definitively,
there is no barbarism without civilization, and vice versa.

The ebb and flow of Alifuru’s identity are determined by the
state’s scope. In the early days of Ternate-Tidore’s expanding
power, Alifuru was used not only to identify the highly
diverse tribes in the interior of Buru, Seram, Halmahera,
but also the Banggai and Sula Islands, the people of North
Sulawesi, especially the Minahasa and Bolaang Mongondow
communities, the southwest Maluku islands, and even Papua.
As the power of the Sultanates and colonials spread and many
of the subjects embraced Islam and Christianity, the Alifuru
identity gradually faded and narrowed. Today, Alifuru is used to
refer to ethnic groups in the interior around Seram and Central
Maluku who still hold on to their original beliefs. However,
some people in the interior of Central Sulawesi, for example,
still remember this identity.

79. Due to the Islands’ topography being absent of mountains or high hills,
the cosmology of the people in the Aru Islands is somewhat unique. The relatively
flat surface of this island produces a concept that divides Aru into two worlds:
the front coast towards the northwest (Banda), which is more cosmopolitan and
inhabited by traders, separated from the back coast (backland) in the southeast,
inhabited by the indigenous people and the source of sea cucumbers and pearls.

96 | Alifuru: Conquest & Liberation

Therefore, the concept of Alifuru cannot be understood in
isolation. Alifuru is merely a side of the same coin that reflects
the relative position of a group in relation to state authority.
The same formulation applies when we discuss the Batak in
Sumatra and the Dayak in Kalimantan.*° Andaya (1993) also
concluded that certain characteristics of Maluku society in the
early modern period revealed the strong influence of broader
Austronesian thought.*!

Being Alifuru is a political choice. If they submitted to the
Sultanate’s power, they could embrace Islam. If they submitted
to European colonial power, they could embrace Christianity
and Catholicism. If they were anarchists, they became Alifuru.
However, embracing state religions did not guarantee full
loyalty from the indigenous population or signify a loss of
autonomy. In reality, neither the sultanates nor colonial states
could fully control their subjects.

Power in the context of eastern Indonesian islands is not
accurately illustrated by dotted lines and shading on a map.
Rather, it is more accurately likened to the light of a torch, as in
European Enlightenment thought, Western civilization is the
source of illumination, awakening, progress, and development.
The further we are from that light source, the more we move to
the periphery, the dimmer the light and the darker it becomes.
Although this expression may seem exaggerated, it is what
James C. Scott (2009: 45) refers to as ‘friction of distance’:

80. See my previous study, in Bima Satria Putra, Dayak Mardaheka: Sejarah
Masyarakat Tanpa Negara di Pedalaman Kalimantan (2021).

81. Seen in an even broader context, the phenomenon of statelessness has
been a feature of social organization in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The Tobelo
settlement called /oana is also used by the Minahasa people and ancient Javanese
(wanua), Dayak (banua), as well as in Hawaii (honua) and Fiji (vanua). Latu in
Seram also has the same meaning as in the Philippines (datz), ancient Java and Fiji
(ratu).

Alifuru: Conquest & Liberation | 97

“Before the distance-demolishing technology of railroads and
all-weather motor roads, land-bound polities in Southeast Asia
and Europe found it extremely difficult, without navigable
waterways, to concentrate and then project power.”

In the state formation project, the Dutch used all disciplinary
tools from their colonial toolkit, as mentioned by Manse
(2021: 541): structural disarmament, resettlement, forcing
villagers to settle, dismissing village heads and breaking local
ties between land and communities to reorganize movements
and hierarchies, along with introducing labor services and
taxes. Knaap (2003: 181) also cited four elements of conquest,
namely: military domination, controlled populations, divide
and rule tactics, and building consensus.

Ternate and Tidore had no ambition or power to conquer the
interior, but the Dutch were different. The Dutch had naval
superiority, and because of this, they were more powerful
maritime-wise. The Dutch found it easier to conquer the
coasts and made the coastal population their main allies in
conquering the interior. But once the Dutch conquered the
mountain settlements, they forced the Alifuru to move to the
coast to be more easily monitored.

The form of social organization in Maluku, marked by political
fragmentation, was also a major obstacle to the state formation
project. For example, in order for the Dutch to conquer West
Seram (Hoamoal) and Ambon Lease, Knaap (2003) referred
to this process as the Hundred Years’ War: “There was no clear
centre in the area. Consequently, shortly after one political
factor was eliminated, another quickly arose to take its place.”

98 | Alifuru: Conquest & Liberation

An equally important aspect of the colonial project to
restore societal conditions was the cooperation of indigenous
community leaders, whose interests rarely fully aligned with
those of the Dutch (Manse, 2021: 544). Chiefs were appointed
and endorsed by the Dutch, and given greater power than
what was given in their traditional authority. For instance, the
position and role of Latu in the Wemale society of Seram were
manipulated by granting them full rights as representatives in
land release negotiations if desired by the colonial government
(Topatimasang, 2016: 159).

It is not an exaggeration to say that many tactics of Ternate-
Tidore and the Dutch are still employed by the Indonesian
nation-state. The strategy of power centralization today keeps
the colonial legacy alive.

Lastly, society and the state are two different entities and are
often in conflict. The state may emerge from within society,
but society can abort it; the state’s tentacles may grip a society,
but society can cut them off; civilization attempts to tame,
but wild and uncontrollable anarchy keeps flourishing. The
state can crumble, corrode, and disband, but society remains.
The historical conjuncture of Maluku is best understood by
examining the formation and reduction of power.

In his explanation of political organization in Southeast
Seram, Ellen (2003: 38) described: “Some were federations of
equals; others were semiautonomous groups in a hierarchical
relationship within a larger semicentralized domain. Moreover,
their existence and specific composition appear to have been in
a continuous state of flux.” Kolff in the early 19th century also
stated that the Arafura [Alifuru] in Wetar considered themselves
subordinate to coastal inhabitants. However, Kolff wrote, “The
Arafuras of the interior had been in a very unsettled state some

Alifuru: Conquest & Liberation | 99

time past, all regularity of government having been put an end

to by the death of the Raja...”*”

History in Maluku can be viewed from the perspective of the
rulers and the ruled; I take the latter. Instead of interpreting
history as an evolutionary stage from low-level savage societies
destined to follow the flow of civilization (where they have
become the main victims of development), we must understand
this history as a process of capture-escape and snatch-collapse.
This is the perspective of the Alifuru — the people whom
surrounding state formation projects have been trying to rule
for centuries. This is the historical perspective of those who
were ruled and conquered. This approach is sometimes called
“people’s history,” occasionally “history from below,” and more
recently, “anarchist history.”

Thus, I reject Andaya’s (1993: 49) understanding, who said
that “Maluku is neither a political state nor a stateless society.”
According to him, local traditions explaining a relationship
between a community and other communities — be them on a
certain island or within the broader Maluku World — function
as a guiding map and authorize political expansion, while
providing an accepted basis for action sans political pressures
amid cultural and societal differences.

Instead, I propose that historically there has been a separation,
two spaces and worlds, namely the state space (Maluku World)
and the stateless space (Alifuru World). The relationship and
position of both have been thoroughly discussed previously,
and many of its elements help us explain the Maluku landscape
formed today.

82. Kolff, Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War Dourga (1840), 44.

100 | Alifuru: Conquest & Liberation

As analyzed by Hagerdal (2024), legends and traditions about
the beginning of European colonial presence in Southeast Asia
sometimes depict foreigners as protectors, but also as largely
dangerous and unreliable forces. The people of Maluku did not
always see their relationships with Tidore-Ternate or European
rulers as beneficial. If they became subjugated or victims of
piracy, many communities across Maluku saw Europeans as
potential allies and new rulers. At the same time, being under
the shadow of government for most of the time was clearly
unpleasant. It meant being regulated and supervised, taxed and
levied, and their labor mobilized for things that typically only
benefited the ruling class.

The most accurate conclusion at present is that the Alifuru
became anarchists not because they were too ignorant to form
a state. The Alifuru became anarchists also not simply because
they were too far from the reach of government services and
power. The Alifuru were anarchists because their society
was characterized by relative equality; consensus decision-
making; and the absence of centralized political institutions.
Furthermore, they continuously fought for autonomy and
actively strove to prevent themselves from forming a state. This
means that the Alifuru were consciously and actively anarchist.
They knew what they were avoiding and what they wanted.

KK

Alifuru: Conquest & Liberation | 101

And now, what is the benefit of this text?

Amid the roar of mining machinery and rainforest continuously
transformed for large-scale plantation openings dragging us
to the brink of mass extinction and climate crisis, we need to
rethink all the assumptions of civilization and development
being touted today. What is the meaning of progress in modern
history? Both capitalism and communism, though differing
in their approaches, utilize the same vehicle of industrialism
and believe that there are historical stages leading to progress.
‘These stages are sometimes bridged by rapid social changes, a
revolution. But Walter Benjamin has an alternative suggestion:
“Marx said that revolutions are the locomotive of world history.
But perhaps it is quite otherwise. Perhaps revolutions are an
attempt by the passengers on the train — namely, the human
race — to activate the emergency brake.”

Our economic-political order has gone too far and too fast.
It is a global machine driven by the law of limitless growth
that drastically reduces the Earth’s capacity to support a more
habitable ecosystem. This was already Wallace’s contemplation
hundreds of years ago. During his time in Aru, his worldview
changed drastically. He began to question why European-
made goods were sold cheaper in Aru than in their place of
origin, even though these goods were not truly needed by the
indigenous population. He realized something was wrong with
the global economic order at that time.

“[...] that in one of the most remote corners of the
earth savages can buy clothing cheaper than the
people of the country where it is made ; that the
weavers child should shiver in the wintry wind,

83. Walter Benjamin, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, 1938-1940, edited
by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (1996).

102 | Alifuru: Conquest & Liberation

unable to purchase articles attainable by the wild
natives of a tropical climate where clothing is mere
ornament or luxury, should make us pause ere
we regard with unmixed admiration the system
which has led to such a result, and cause us to look
with some suspicion on the further extension of
that system. It must be remembered too than our
commerce is not a purely natural growth. It has
been ever fostered by the legislature, and forced to
an unnatural luxuriance by the protection of our
fleets and armies. The wisdom and the justice of
this policy have been already doubted. So soon,
therefore, as it is seen that the further extension of
our manufactures and commerce would be an evil,
the remedy is not far to see.”

The remedy is not far off, said Wallace. If we seek inspiration
for revolution, perhaps we need to stop, if necessary, go
backwards. I am not proposing that we return to the past. I
do not mean for us to behead, or destroy our own property, or
flee to the mountains, like the Alifuru ancestors once did. I am
proposing decolonization, because being free from colonialism
and forming a new state alone is not enough, and has even
proven to be disastrous. The inspiration needed may not come
from the Western world, but here now on our land. Look at
Nunusaku, there is anarchy, and Mikhail Bakunin would surely
agree,

| 103

RRARARKRRRRE LS

HENAMASAWATYA

Hena masa waya waiya lete huni mu ao
<< Yuri tasi bea sala ne kotika o »«
A oleh ruma 0 ruma singgi sopa o
xX ~~

O paune ite kibi ratu hira roli o

x Meaning: »<«
The Countries in lofty places where we reside in
< MU are buried in water day and night. »<«

Upon tracing the origins of us all, unmistakably
»< Our houses are genuinely multi-storied, passed «

through generations ©

»< We are all, without exception, like Kings.*# »«

KK KK KKK

84. Siyauta, Saul. ee Hena Masa Man ao Ambon. Quoted
from Aone van a elenhoven. On the philos nie of ‘fo iklore view and proposals.
Leiden Unigene

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About The Author

Bima Satria Putra, born in Kapuas, Central Kalimantan, on
November 4, 1995. Graduated in journalism from Fiskom
UKSW, former Editor-in-Chief of the Student Press Institute
Lentera. Now he is a writer, researcher, and translator.
Interested in the study of history, anthropology, and ecology.
His works include: Perang yang Tidak Akan Kita Menangkan:
Anarkisme & Sindikalisme dalam Pergerakan Kolonial hingga
Revolusi Indonesia (1908-1948) (published in 2018) and Dayak
Mardaheka: Sejarah Masyarakat Tanpa Negara di Pedalaman
Kalimantan (published in 2021). He is currently conducting
research on the Fire Tribes Project (PSA) and remains committed
to writing while serving his fifteen-year prison sentence from
2021.